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# STUDIPOLITICO-STRATEGIC

## Introduction to the non conventional conflittualità

Vol. The

*To James Burnham  
and his/her jewels pontages to the operations QKOPERA and AJAX.*

### INDEX

Introduction	7
1. War and strategy in the non conventional conflittualità	9
2. Non conventional Conflittualità and guerrilla	11
3. Typologies of non conventional conflittualità	13
3 to) The claim doesn't violate and its operational formalities	13
3 bs) The subversive nervousness and his/her operational formalities	15
3 c) Individualization of the sub-judices of the missed operatività	16
4. Actors and ideological orientation of the non conventional conflittualità	17
4 to) The subjects	17
4 bs) The ideological orientation	17
5. Non conventional Conflittualità and countermeasures	19
5 to) Premised	19
5 bs) operational Formality of the countermeasures	19
6. Thematic bibliography	21
Appendix Á.	31
<i>The non conventional conflittualità second gi activists</i>	

to. The non conventional conflittualità according to Graeber	31
b. The non conventional conflittualità according to Negri/Hardt	32
Appendix B	33
<i>Strategy and revolution</i> , of Edgardo Beltrametti	
1. The non conventional war	33
2. The atomic war	34
3. The chemical and bacteriological war	35
4. The defence omnidimensionale	38
Appendix C	57
<i>Guerrilla, controguerriglia and army</i> , of the Gen. Luigi Salatiello	
1. Premise	57
2. Genesis of the guerrilla	58
3. Characteristics of the guerrilla	58
4. Phases of the controguerriglia	59
5. Environmental elements and of situation that you/they furnish the success of the controguerriglia	60
6. Organization of the command	61
7. Organization of the psychological country	61
8. The claims typical of the controguerriglia	62
Appendix D	63
<i>Guerrilla and controguerriglia</i> , of the Ten. With the. Tullio Bottiglioni	
1. Premise	63
2. The phases of the guerrilla	63
3. Conclusions	64
Appendix is	67
<i>The psychological war</i> , of Peter Baroni	
1. Definition of the psychological war	67
to. Doctrinaire Concetto	
b. Nature of the concept	
c. Philosophy of the concept	
2. Purposes and objectives	68
3. Deception and simulation	69
to. Concetto	
b. Nature	
4. Some examples of psychological war of the past	71
to. The terrorism as war procedure	
b. Goebbels: the genius of the propaganda	
5. The psychological war as fundamental element of the lump strategy Necessity of the psychological war and his/her prominent function	73
6. The principles, the concepts, the criterions, the tools	74
to. The in hand means and the applicable metologies	
b. Propaganda and hidden enticement	
7. The countermeasures	75
8. Lexicon of the psychological war	76
to. Training	
b. Bank of the data	
c. Control	

## INTRODUCTION

Is Qual the strategic logic that directs the routine of those people that you/they practise the civil disobedience? Of those people that effect inclusive practices among the not duress and the sabotage? Is Qual the grammar of their language? And is it inquadabile in the context of the strategic art above all (how he/she preferred Clausewitz to denominate her/it)? Which are the component caratterizzantis of the practical contestataries?

And, do elements of continuity exist between the new operational formalities and those traditional particularly? To these questions, fondamentalemente, wants to answer the volume. We immediately antedate the existence of common elements to the reader that results evident between the guerrilla and the non conventional conflittualità - days for grace coined by Pisano - especially in relationship to the psychological dimension that unites the guerrilla to the subversive nervousness and the claim he/she doesn't violate. As it regards the guerrilla, the express thesis is thought to in two famous manuals of guerrilla USA: that of Winberley and that of Newman.

*Winberley* (official SF) it underlines as "guerrilla warfare is essentially to political war." Accordingly "in to political war, human being should be considered the priority objective." If it is so the psychological dimension is essential: "The conception of guerrilla warfare as political war turns psychological operations into to decisive tool." Concretely the purpose will be to effect "the minds of all population."

Therefore the combining of military and psychological operations is conclusive for the result: "psychological activities should be conducted simultaneous with military actions in order to achieve the desired objective."

Likewise *Newman* (official of the USMC) it sets the emphasis on the conquest of the "Hearts and minds" and particularly on her "patience, tenacity, initiative, aggression", but above all "struggle" that in Vietnamese as dau is translated trann. The application of this principle is possible because it "means to will ingress to fight forever against the savage invaders in to glorious and righteous contest in wich every person participated must (...) Them this concept comes the foundation of the succesfull guerrilla war." The three elements that constitute her/it are dan van, binh var but particularly the dich van that is the propaganda or action among the enemy.

In relationship to the claim he/she doesn't violate the reflections of *Sharp they will* allow to individualize those strategic constants that unite these practices of struggle and resistance beyond the differences. At the end of the search it will result clear as to unfold him some claim he/she doesn't violate answers to a logic of war even if well camouflaged to lexical and ideological level. Let's not forget us that the war has a nature proteiforme or chameleonic as it asserts Clausewitz. Of however, proper *Sharp*, through the Albert Einstein Institute, has made his/her own professionalism to create the conditions to program a destabilizzazione available - through the GROUP Otpar - towards Milosevic, in Georgia and in Ukraine. His/her recent consultations - 2002 - to Iraq National Council goes to the same direction.

In conclusion, is the subversive nervousness that the claim doesn't violate, you/they can consider him techniques of destabilizzazione neutral fondamentalemente beyond the philosophical or religious presuppositions and, really for such motivation you/they can be folded up to the more different political wishes. The romantic season of the claim doesn't violate you/he/she has come at the end and, for irony of the fate, really thanks to the pontages of one of its most authoritative exponents.

## 1. WAR IS STRATEGY IN THE CONFLITTUALITÀ NON CONVENTIONAL

The actual trend of the strategic analysts - in relationship to the opportunity of riconcettualizzare the war and the strategy - it is that to proceed to a semantic amplamento of the two concepts able to give account of an ample range of phenomenons. To such intention the definitions of war of *Busetto* and *Bill* result particularly effective for our purposes. From an in general *Busetto* defines the war as “the opposition among human GROUPs arranged of duration variable in which both the contenders try to impose one to the other his/her own wish”; from the other side *Bill* as one “opposition of wish among organizations that impose any half violent or coercive to impose his/her own interest.” Regarding the concept of strategy the ample definition of the Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage: “the art and the science of the development and the employment of necessary political, economic, psychological and military strengths in peace and in war to increase the probability of victory”, it results consistent and effective together since it allows us to include an ample plurality of military actors and not.

These three definitions set us under the conditions of contestualizzare - within the strategic studies - the non conventional conflittualità (in the meaning of *Pisano*), conflittualità that he/she embraces the guerrilla, the onset of the civil war and the terrorism. Nevertheless, the CNC - to the purpose to constitute an useful device - it has to include the psychological war, the Information warfare, the cultural war and the cyberwarfare - also in the respect of their autonomy. The digit caratterizzante of the CNC is her/it not linearity of its dynamics, not linearity that can arouse surprise near that analysts - as *Jean* - that you/they have repeatedly underlined the chameleonic nature of the war in how much such, the nature, would be tried to say clausewitziana some war. On the other hand, also the Chinese analysts *Liang* and *Xiangsui* - as on the other hand *Beaufre* - they set the emphasis on the mutable nature of the war compared to one “kind of dragon endowed with torso, head and arts interscambiabili to be prepared to liking and to make to freely move in every direction.” Also in the interpretation of other *Jean* “strengths or component (those politics, social, economic and psychological, for instance) you/they have brought more and more to a vanished distinction between war and conflict. Just for this also the concept of war must be widens up to comment her/it as “a pontage of wish and contrasted strategic intelligence.” Well, one of the most evident consequences are not able whether to be the formulation of the purposes of the strategy. In fact is *Jean* that *Defargueses* are convinced that strategy has to suit himself/herself/themselves for the grammar of the reality and, particularly, *Beaufre* underlined - in farsighted way - as the strategy it had to harmonize different components to reach the last purposes of the political decision. Despite the nature proteiforme of the CNC the open rationalization and criticism of his/her dynamics it allows to individualize some essential elements of base of it. The Chinese analysts - aware of the triadic grate of von Clausewitz - they reach to individualize five fundamental relationships that are at the base of the conventional war and of the CNC: “1) the dominant weapons; 2) the dominant means; 3) the dominant form; 4) the dominant directive; 5) the dominant circle.”

As for the specific grammar of the CNC or the war without limits their conclusions he can easily summarize in the following way: 1) omnidirezionalità; 2) handshaking; 3) objective abridged; 4) boundless means; 5) asymmetry; 6) least consumption; 7) coordination rettidimensionale; 8) control and correction of the whole trial. Finally, in comparison to the tassonomia pisaniana, that of the Chinese analysts is - at the same time - ampler and less generic. According to the Chinese researchers three typologies of possible conflicts would exist: 1) military operational methods (p. and. the terrorism and the guerrilla); 2) trans-military methods (p. and. the war of network, of intelligence and that psychological); 3) non military methods (the trade war, the ideological war, that mediatica, etc.). Well, departing from assumes him that the preceding ranking doesn't exclude the possibility of one hold of theirs connection, the Chinese analysts they express the conviction on the straodinaria effectiveness of the combo of the different operational methods. Nevertheless - in the interpretation pisaniana of the CNC - a formality operational absentee exists in that some Chinese analysts: the subversive nervousness (AS).

According to *Pisano* (RM) the AS esula from the democratic context and it is unfolded through an effective combo of violent claim and he/she doesn't violate: “the misinformation, the tendentious propaganda, the assemblages and the prejudicial processions of the orderly carrying out of the social lifetime, disorders of plaza, occupations of immovable properties, lesions to the people and often threats.”

Meaningful - it seems us - the precise statement of the actor according to which “the AS unites militant I stretched out toward the passive resistance and the disobedience civil and real violent.” This reflection is to speculate to that of *Rapetto* and *Of Messenger* according to which the actual protests have of aim “objective transnazionali, general purpose and symbolic in the most varied ways, violent or you don't violate that they are.”

## 2. CONFLITTUALITÀ NON CONVENTIONAL AND GUERRILLA

The strategic reflection of *Jean* allows us an interesting organization of the AS. Also this is realized - as the guerrilla - through: 1) the claim of propaganda; 2) the political penetration; 3) the availment of the resistance doesn't violate and of the civil disobedience; 4) the use of the sabotage; 5) the use of the popular support; 6) the availment of the tactic of the wearing out; 7) the necessity to promote an economic war with political purpose; 8) the availment of the defensive protection and the mobility.

Also without troubling von Clausewitz, Sun-Tzu and Machiavelli had already set in evidence the importance of the misinformation, of the technique of the suspect and the plot to psychologically weaken the adversary. Hourly also in the AS these techniques from ‘pioneer you/they are broadly used.

Particularly - thanks to the availability of the technology - the *CNN effect* becomes a conclusive tool is in the high-technology war that in the AS. After all in the guerrilla also of the AS the conquest of the ‘heart and of the mind of the civil company and the same opponents, it dresses again a decisive function. Remaining in the context of the interpretation of *Jean*, the extender of the checked space is essential in the conventional war, but it doesn't have relief in the AS which is directed to create TAZ (to use the expression of *Bey*) whose modus operandi - p. and. in fact of values - it is usually contrasted to the approved values. Also the dimension of the time is not marginal since the use of a claim to surprise can be revealed of extreme operational effectiveness forcing the adversary to accelerate the rhythms of the political decisions.

To the peer of that of *Jean*, the interpretation of *Brau* seems us particularly effective with the purpose to decode the syntax of the AS. As the guerrilla also the AS proceeds through a gradual corrosion of the social claim through - p. and. - the strike and the nervousness of plaza constant. Just to amplify this effect, the job of propaganda on the masses is of enormous relief (both in the guerrilla and in the AS). To such intention - it underlines the Á.. - the job of propaganda within the intellectuals of left and the student masses is of great importance, since “the people more than the other ones are ready to project his/her own illusions on a symbol of antagonist.” And whether to say - it continues the Á.. - of he/she asked her and of the rare confessional groupings whose idealism is easily lent to the manipulation? Besides the political claim of propaganda is conclusive because “it concerns the organization and the training of the civil company, the propaganda and the psychological claim.”

Also the psychological profile of the ‘attivista guerrillero introduces lines common with the activist of the AS, from the moment that - p. and. - the initiative and the improvisation are essential quality for an effective claim. In conclusion *Brau* as *Marighella*, it sets the emphasis on the conclusive role that students, intellectuals and men of faith dress again in the psychological war.

Interesting you sprout you/they can also be individualized in the reflections of the *Magg. Von Dach* especially in worth to the role of the passive resistance and, particularly, on the info, on the propaganda and on the espionage. In fact, also within the AS, the activist has to develop assignments analogous to those of the guerrillero: “1) to maintain settles the wish to withstand; 2) to build printout and radio to make the contropropaganda.” The passive resistance that will have effected with professionalism will determine in the adversary insecurity and isolation (the Á.. ‘Moral effect of the Resistance denominates her/it). Also *Von Dach* as *Brau*, cannot do to less less than to set together the emphasis on the delicate and vital role that the psychological control of the youth dresses again. In last analysis - to use the words of *Begarie* - her “prominence of the psychological operations (in the guerrilla as in the AS ndr) it allows to create an area of osmosis between him (that is among the guerrillero ndr) and the civil

company.” If a constant element emerges, inside these interpretations, this is surely the central role of the *psywar* that *Lutwak* and *Ketel* define in the following way: “the PW concerns the measures destined to influence the adversary to be able to exploit him/it to the goals of manipulator with the availment of images, of the military coordination diplomatic e/o, to create you determine images with which to exploit the existing tensions.”

### 3. TYPOLOGIES OF CONFLITTUALITÀ NON CONVENTIONAL

The claim doesn't violate and its operational formalities

“Power doesn't grant anything without asking. You/he/she has never done him/it and it won't do him/it.” Douglas

What the operational syntax of the ANV reenters to full security within the CNC and therefore within the strategic studies, you/he/she is broadly tried by the fact that *Sharp* expressly recognizes the asymmetrical dispersion of the ANV in the moment in which the connota as “filiation with the reflections of *Liddle Hart* on the indirect approach and on the guerrilla.”

We see to illustrate, in the detail, the possible analogies between the ANV and the guerrilla. The psychological profile of the activist NV has to introduce precise characteristics: the indefeasible trust (in the values and in the choices), the courage (of his/her own ideas and of his/her own claims), the workmanship and the perseverance. The leader's functions activist - as of the ‘head guerrillero - you/they cannot be that those to formulate the strategy, the tactic, the bargaining with the adversary, the encouragement of his/her own mates, the choice of the opportune moment and the palimony of the discipline. In fact, the technical preparation and practice of the activist it is decisive for the good result of his/her own projects. If the wearing out of the adversary is one of the purposes of the ANV, it will be worthwhile to not only focus himself/herself/themselves on the weak pixels (as in the circle of any conventional conflict or less) but to contemplate to the attainment of partial victories, but well you consolidate. To such purpose, the publications and the education of the masses (we are within the *psywar*) they will facilitate the effectiveness of circumscribed victories but solid (we specify that one of the clearest differences with the guerrilla consist in the publicizing both of the objectives that of his/her own organization charts, while in the guerrilla the dimension of the secrecy is essential). To return to the individualization of a ground common with the operational formality of the guerrilla, also the ANV will owe spiazzare the adversary or - to use the expression of *Sharp* - “to bring the enemy out of its usual territory.” To such purpose, to maintain and to take the initiative they are priority aspects of the ANV, as to effect a clear command line and rapids will facilitate the claim. Dell IW serving himself/herself/itself and of the PWs the activist (of the ANV, of the AS or of the guerrilla) it will have to try to determine events or to use events to create the conditions of a scandal (with relative indignation of the public estimation) of national or international course to the purpose to weaken the psychological resistances of the adversary. Always to increase the weakness of his/her own adversary, using himself/herself/itself the PW the activist will have to promote, in the lines avversarie, defections, inside distributions or mutinies. In general - as it realistically recognizes *Sharp* - the trailing result will contribute: 1) to economically damage the adversary; 2) to create disorders; 3) to make to rise or to make to increase the inside opposition. Also in the context of the ANV they will be possible solo three trailing options: to) complete victory; b) defeated complete or - in the most greater party of the cases - c) arrangement.

Despite is possible to distinguish between the routine of the ANV and that some AS, it has to result clear that on theirs to unfold him I embody the contamination of their languages it is realized of frequent and with great effectiveness. Before passing to the analytical examination of the operational formalities of the ANV it will be opportune to specify how much it follows: both the ANV that the AS you/they can be realized only within a democratic institution, because this allows an ample possibility

of expression and claim. Contrarily, if you/they were effected in regime of military occupation or if you/they were used inside a system to be able dictatorial or totalitarian, two options would be introduced only: or the transformation of the ANV and the AS in guerrilla and terrorism or the military repression.

The circles in which he develops - operationally - the ANV I am - according to the interpretation of *Sharp* - the followings: 1) protest and enticement he/she doesn't violate, 2) not social collaboration; 3) not economic collaboration; 4) not political collaboration; 5) intervention I don't violate. I underline that the *rasegna sharpiana* is essential for our purposes from the moment that it allows us to concretely clarify the sense of the CNC.

We give hourly to point out the operational formalities of every circle.

As it regards the *first* circle the techniques harvest in work they are the followings: 1) talked public, letters of opposition, signatures of public disclosures, slogan, banners, apparent, fliers, brochures, books, journals, seen again, disks, radio and TV, parliamentary pressure groups, picketing, controelezioni, exposure of flags and portraits, symbolic claim, disrespectful gestures, vigil, assemblies and assemblies of protest, theatrical and musical shows.

In the *second* circle *Sharp* enumerates: the social sabotage (General and selective), strike, civil disobedience, recall for protest from the social institutions, not collaboration, emigration for protest.

In the *third* circle operational formalities are unfolded in the following way: refusal to pay the taxes, lockout, strike (of protest, lightning, of solidarity, white and selective).

In the *fourth* circle *Sharp* points out not the violent practical followings: boycotting of legislative organs, boycotting of elections and departments, recall from educational institutions, boycotting of organizations filogovernative, not collaboration with the police and with the military institutions, refusal to accept the imposition of public county clerks, refusal to loosen the existing institutions, popular disobedience, sit-down, not collaboration with conscriptions and deportations, to hide himself/herself/themselves to assume false identities and mutiny.

Finally in the last circle, the *fifth one*, *Sharp* underlines the opportunity to proceed in the following way: fast, claim of harassment doesn't violate, sit-in, occupation stand-in, occupation laugh-in, raid, occupation doesn't violate, istaurazione of new social models, theater of guerrilla, institutions social alternatives, selective patronage, publication of writs top secret, to try to make himself/herself/themselves arrest and finally two-tier sovereignty and parallel government.

Also the reflection of *Capitini* is of capital importance. Beyond the metaphysical presuppositions exquisitely (I allude to the theory of the *compresenza*), the typologies of ANV have antedated - in wide measure - those of *Sharp* and integrated those of Gandhi with the European and American partiches. The zoofilia, the vegetarian and the prayer, are formality typical of the philosophy *capitiniiana*, while the others (march, strike, dialogue, fast, civil disobedience and not collaboration) I derive also from the reflection (long and deepened) on the work of Gandhi. As for the remaining ones are changed from the experiences of the Anglo-Saxon countries and among these: 1) jalli in; 2)freedom riderses; 3) stand in; 4) wade in; 5) kneel in; 6) teach in. But the aspect that seems us more meaningful consists in the explicit demand to theorize a pedagogy he/she doesn't violate not only alluding to specific centers of training, but to the necessity of reinterpretare - both in the schools and in the universities - the history, to narrate anew her to the light of the philosophy of the not duress. Well, it perhaps is not this one evident example of psywar inside the institutions?

Of however - the reader allows him/it - the expressions 'not duress or 'pacifism they divert - on the semantic plan - the reader in remarkable way not allowing to understand him, with the necessary lucidity, that the strategy of these *weltanshaungs* is that to capsize determined values and you determines institutions (from the capitalism to the representative democracy up to the military institutions). On the other hand, *Jean* had to his/her underlined time - not without irony - that "radical pacifism implicates that the war is a crime and the soldiers a kind of particular criminals to hold in the cage." In other words, the philosophy of the not duress - brought to his/her extreme consequences - it constitutes a real disclosure of *overall war* or *annihilation* under the psychological and cultural profile in in general sense. Paradoxically - under certain verses - it plans purpose more radical than the same conventional war because turns - in conclusion - to the conquest and the deep change of the heart and the minds.

The subversive nervousness and his/her operational formalities

The preliminary preparation - to put in field the AS - it is not dissimilar from the practices of the ANV. In first place we should individualize 1) the purpose of a mobilization and then 2) it will be necessary to not only inquire himself/herself/themselves on the aspects of the problem list to face, but also on the actors and on the institutions avversarie. After having individualized the 'I bombard 3 it will be opportune) to seek alliances. To level of organization it interns himself/herself/themselves it will opt - preferably - for a lay-out to net or for GROUPs of affinity, avoiding - there where possible will be - a hierarchical training. In the symbolic circle the availment of 4) apparent, T-shirt, mosaics of asphalt, graffiti or false first pages, can constitute a good solution. To level of IW the construction 5) of a site web that feeds the controinformazione is one it covers fundamental as much as 6) the realization of a bureau presses. To such intention 7) the activity mediatica will have to build him around simple rules: to) the news will have to be of actuality; b) connotarla will be necessary in dramatic way; c) you/he/she must be individualizes the source toward which to manifest his/her own dissent; d) it will be had to handle to create the conditions for an alliance with belonging known names to the culture, to the show, to the politics or to the religious reality to the purpose to amplify the pregnancy of the messaging or its 'effect detonante but c) above all they will be had to create the presuppositions for a scandal of national or international dimensions. In the case - finally - of an ample demonstration f) the mobilization will owe - awry - to have an efficient regal and a good logistics (especially in forecast of clashes arrangements or less with the police or of rapid retreats). On-line General, the disorientation and the sovraidentificazione (theorized by *Blisset*) they will constitute essential ingredients.

We pass hourly to the techniques in the different contexts:

To) within the cyberwarfare the activist will make use 1) of the mail-bombing; 2) of the net-strike; 3) of the radio and of the web alternative for the controinformazione and the misinformation; 4) of national and international links;

B) in the context of the offesa/difesa not computer science, the activist will make use of operational formality broadly experimented by the guerrilla: 1) you barricade; 2) destruction of proprietorship; 3) throwing molotov; 4) tactic of the you and you run away (or of the evanescence);

finally to level of C) spatial organization the subversive agitator will use: 1) of the self-management to sabotage the hierarchical lay-outs; 2) of the realization of stand-alone and alternative spaces (p. and. the CSAs); 3) of the shake march and of 4) lie-in.

Individualization of the sub-judices of the missed operatività

It is not arduous to individualize the motivations that can conduct to the failure. Let's pass her in review: 1) inside distributions; 2) repression (politics or military); 3) decline for 'autocombustione interns; 4) bureaucratization; 5) isolation (determined p. and. from the sectarianism); 6) cooptazione (p. and. between Org and multinationals, as in the case of the Shell and the Monsanto) and finally 7) corruption.

#### 4. ACTORS IT IS CONVENTIONAL IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION OF THE CONFLITTUALITÀ NON

The subjects

To this pixel of the discourse it races the obligation to poll him on the subjects that feed both the AS and the ANV, remembering to the reader that both are broadly been used by the '64 to the '77 in Europe and in USA (often degenerating in the urban guerrilla and in the terrorism). In fact, the activists that

coordinate and they feed the practices of non conventional conflittualità belong to a large extent really to that period and they stir (together with the new levers) inside the followings circles: 1) Ong; 2) verified; 3) parties; 4) movements; 5) colletivi; 6) CSA; 7) religious movements (of inspiration monoteista, polytheist and new age). The age of the activists proceeds within a very ample chronological band that has been going for the sixteen years a seventy years, as much as the social affiliation: from 1) sottoproletariato, to 2) unemployed, to 3) precarious, up to 4) public and private employee, to 5) intellectual worker, to the 6) student, to the 7) free professionals and, finally, in small measure to the 8) contractors.

The ideological orientation

Also it is multiform and variegated, since he/she understands the reality

to) *anarchist* (and more precisely the anarco-individualism, the anarco-communism, the anarchic syndicalism, the anarco-insurrezionalismo and the echo-anarchism); b) *the libertarian ones* of the inclusive grey area between the anarchic reality and the left neocomunista; c) *communist* and more in the detail that M-L, trotskista, luxemburghiana and castrista; d) *the feminist* reality (communist, anarchist and echo-feminist); and) *syndicalist* (from the radical left up to the anarco-syndicalism); f) *cattocomunista* and present *terzomondista* transversally but particularly rooted in the religious groupings; g) *the new age* and *the fundamentalism religioso*<sup>1</sup>, and to conclude h) *the extra-parliamentary right* (that it unties him from that that practised the terrorism up to the nouvelle French droite) to reach the naziskin/skinheads up to the syncretism political-religious anti-USA and anti-Israeli.

The motivations that animate the variegated practices of the ANV and the AS contemplate to relative changes and circumscribed or, contrarily, to radical changes that can invest different circles: 1) the cultural circle; 2) that psychological; 3) that political; 4) that social and finally 5) that economic.

#### Memorials

<sup>1</sup> one of the consequences - in less predictable truth - some defeat of the movements of the seventies was a sort of 'withdrawn strategic that was concretized - p. and. - in the read or riletatura of Siddharta, in the trips to India, in Nepal, in Tibet, to achieve beyond a greater awareness of him same and above the obsolete western culture. In short the 'spiritual rediscovery became a sort of *sublimation of the uneasiness*. The possibility of a tied up internal rebirth to the New Era will conduct many 's legionaries of the seventies to stick or to found seven religious - often from the gnostic formulation - that in the turn of brief time they will launch an offensive to the traditional religions. The vastness and the relief of the phenomenon you/he/she has induced countries as France, Belgium and Italy to compile cognitive investigations on the new religions (among these that Italian published in April of 1998 from the department of PS). Beyond the analyses of worth, these relationships have had the sure worth to arouse an attention to international level inducing some commentators to underline the opportunity to resort to particular laws in circle penalty. To the light of the context - ample and variegated - of the CNC doesn't seem us a hazardous proposal, neither puzzling tantomeno.

### 5. CONFLITTUALITÀ NON CONVENTIONAL AND COUNTERMEASURES

Premise

Before tracing the different possibilities of contrast, it will be opportune to underline how much it follows: 1) the techniques of the ANV and the AS can indiscriminately be used from government institutions or teocratiche or from organizations (stand-alone and eterodirette from is overseas); 2) in

the optics of the political realism - that we do ours - the non conventional unprejudiced use of the conflittualità (both from the states and from extra-government actors) you/he/she is finalized to the attainment of the power, to its palimony and its extender; 3) finally, any moral assessment on the possible combining of AZN, AS and terrorism (or simply with the guerrilla) it is it deprives of interest and of relief in the context of our job.

Operational formality of countermeasure

One of the first and essential against-measures cannot be that that of 1) to improve (there where of it am really need) the apparatus of intelligence and counter-intelligence that has to be the first defensive line for any serious program of against-measure. In according to place 2) the integration of the police will be essential with the military intelligence; 3) it will need to effect a capillary control of the territory through the scheduled collaboration and permanent of the military institutions with the strengths of local police; 4) it will be necessary to found strengths specialized able to stir with flexibility on different plans (psywarfare, informatic warfare and cyberwarfare) analogous to the Special Forces; 5) it will be essential - in the work of repression - the use of the non lethal weapons; 6) it will be essential to build a bank you date national and European able to interpolate the data; 7) the institution of specific centers of training - to which county clerks will collaborate coming from the defence and from the insides - that it will serve as contraltare to those proposed by Capitini; 8) it will be opportune - in determined cases - to prevent the organization of international events that give credibility to the activists and their motivations; 9) it will be opportune to stimulate the self-discipline of the printed paper and the mass-media (also through clear institutional pressures or not); 10) the planning will have to keep in mind that, the artificial distinction among inside and outdoor safety, witnesses deceptive the proteicità of the CNCs; 11) the control away intelligence will be had to move on a horizontal plan investing in such way you contest social a great deal different; 12) secretare will need there the claims of contrast where is opportune; 13) it will be opportune to effect changes in the penal diritto; 14) it will be necessary to practise to own time the misinformation, the infiltration of provocative syndics to check and to sabotage; 15) it will need to effect a control of the sources of financing and eventually to freeze her; 16) it will be necessary to exploit - thanks to the infiltrators - the rivalry among similar organizations; 17) it will need to set alliances of nature sovranazionale to oppose the possible anti-institutional managers, and finally 18) it will need to make discretionary use of the retorsion.

In the eventuality - all anything else other than improbable - of degenerations toward the guerrilla or the terrorism, the institutions sprite of this massive offensive you/they can be used the whole range of theorized countermeasures and you apply both from the school of Anglo-American against-onset and from the revolutionary war of French school.

To conclude, seems us that an operational formality of great effectiveness both that adopted by the Shin-bet towards the Intifada palestinese, formality that should also be extended in different political contexts.

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The three volumes can consider him a sort of strategic essay of the ANV articulated according to a tripartite scheme: to) sociological and psychological study of the concept of power and authority; b) historical analysis of the ANV; c) individualization of the operational formalities of the ANV. It is not not at all exaggerator to assert that the essay has - historically - the same weight of the essay of Von Clausewitz and it constitutes therefore a pixel of essential reference for a systematic study of the ANV.

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The volume deserves an underscore apart since it constitutes a precious testimony of a stand-alone community that - to the peer of those anarchists - you/he/she has believed to create an own logic of lifetime, in the intentions deeply alternative to that usual.

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The agile volumetto completes an investigation to everything field on the CSAs and on their principals protagonists.

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### Anarchism

Well afar to want to distantly complete also a rassegna exhaustive on the anarchic culture (and on his/her routine) we abridge there to signal only that actors or those useful publications for our job.

*Anarchic ecology*

Apart the jobs of Boockin, fundamental they are the essays of *J. Zerzan*, and particularly the *Dictionary primitivista* (and. Nautilus, 2004), and the long essay of the actor *The modern* available *anti-world* on the site [www.anarchaos.it](http://www.anarchaos.it). Always in the context of the foreign saggistica, fundamental it is the site of the green anarchy [www.green.anarchy.org](http://www.green.anarchy.org). In our country, besides the publication wild "Terra", operates him of *Mark Camenish it is* of particular relief. To such intention the following volume is read:

AA.VV., *Resignation is complicity*, and. free him 1992.

*Anarchic pedagogy*

Besides the suitable volumes previously the reader allows us to postpone IDEN to the international direttorio (available on Internet) essential to understand projects and practices of alternative education.

*Anarco-insurrezionalismo and armed struggle*

Near the house publishing Anarchism is possible to retrieve all the works of A.M. Bonanno (theoretical of the anarco-insurrezionalismo). As for the struggle armed with anarchic stub is postponed to the magazine "Times of War."

*Seen again Italian*

Germinal (publication of the Area friulana);

Linking Wobbly;

Anarchic communism;

Libertarian;

Seen Á. again;

Anarchic seed;

Libertarian Sicily (founded from Warlike it is the pixel of reference of the Sicilian anarchism);

Humanity New (Seen again founded by Malatesta it is the publication of greater authoritativeness of the Italian anarchic movement).

*International and national managers*

IFA (direttorio that unites the anarchic federations to world level).

You do (the Italian federation for excellence).

I circulate Anarchist Bridge of the Ghisolfi (real institution of the more anarchism next to the new generations).

*Internet sites*

Also here the complete review would poorly be meaningful for our purposes. We point out only that sites whose material it is of particular pregnancy for the non conventional conflittualità.

www.ainfosica/it  
www.ech.org/contropotere  
tuttosquat.net  
www.socialismolibertario.it

## PREMISED Á. THE APPENDIXES

If there is not some doubt that the reasonings - penetrating and innovative together - some Actors belong to a precise season of our country - the sixties - the reflection on the revolutionary war within the institute Pollio (1965), of the military institute Marselli (1967) from Beltrametti and the considerations of counter-insurgency of Salatiello and Bottiglioni (respectively turns in the Superior Course of SM near the School of War in Civitavecchia in 1968 and to the 40° Superior Course of the School of Aerial War in Florence in 1968) they seem us worthy of the maximum consideration, above all because all and three the actors - with different emphasis - they not only underlined the urgency of immediate against-measures in front of the extremist onset, but also because they shinely understood the importance of the psychological factor (and therefore of the psywar) in the context of the new different conflittualità a great deal from the nuclear dissuasion.

In relationship to journalist Barons' essay, the thematic ones you not only face they broadly result coherent with the intent of our search but - with the birth and the development of the computer nets - you/they have acquired a greater relief.

Finally, as it regards the appendix Á., the reasonings of Graeber, originating from an authoritative exponent of the dissent registered USA, I am a precious open source to try our theses.

Also the theses of Negri/Hardt profits are revealed for the awareness that the theorists of the dissent show in to understand the shifts of the strategic context.

## APPENDIX Á.

to. The non conventional conflittualità according to Graeber

To the purpose to exemplify a party of our reflections, it will be opportune to make reference to the interesting considerations of David Graeber, teacher of Anthropology to the Yale University and activist of the Direct Action Network and the People's Global Action.

The actor observes - pleased - as to rise some movement literally has spiazzato the academic left.

In according to place, the role of the anarchism and - in general of the anti-authoritarian movement - you/he/she has been essential really for the anarco-libertarian nature. The institutions (what prepared were to the pure and simple urban guerrilla) they have been disoriented. Of however the particularity of the movement is also related to its trasversalità (anarchists, socialist, Indian gandhiani, verified teachers Spanish, Sem Terra) that you/he/she has not prevented the to rise up of a first direttorio - risen in 1998 - known as People's Global Action, trasversalità that is manifested hourly of equal footstep with the combo of new formalities operational masses in field from the DAN, hourly from the Reclaim the Streets to reach the white overall and the Black Bloc. A non marginal aspect has strongly been the ample use of a symbolic language (p. and. with the Multimillionaires for Bush or with the

revolutionaries anarchist clown bloc). A considerable party of these practices not only sinks in the claim of the years Sixty and Seventy, that is in the experiences of the theater-guerrilla, of the metropolitan Indians, but especially in those of the EZLN (also for their lay-out to net), of the feminism and of the activism in defense of the forests of the American Northwest. Realistically the actor the fact doesn't hide him that the excess of autonomy and trasversalità you/he/she has brought to the distributions and the sectarianism, but above all to the scarce duration in the time. To return to the used techniques, the actor accepts both the sabotage and the tactic of the evanescence, also recognizing that the police, if they preventively intervene I am able to arrange a hard hit to the movements (as during the Summit for the Free Trade Area in 2000). Finally, deed of the control that the corporations practice on the media taking, the actor expresses the demand to create midrange center independent able to answer pixel on pixel to the misinformation of state.

b. The non conventional conflittualità according to Negri/Hardt

The actors are fully aware of as the apparatus of power owes "to repress the movements of resistance" and to do so that the strategy accommodates him "as controinsurrezione shaping himself/herself/itself." Such adaptation makes him necessary since the enemy is also changed.

After having exposed the salient lines of the RMA and to have individualized its limits, the Actors they formulate a consideration of great importance: to have neglected the humint and exasperated possession the importance of the technological element it constitutes a serious bug. So much is true that the historical experience of the guerrilla has shown the effectiveness of an asymmetrical conflict (you are thought about Vietnam, to Nicaragua and El Salvador). On the other hand, the same evolution of the inside organization of the resistance - to form reticolare - it subsequently complicates the assignment of the against-insurrection.

Certainly the typologies of guerrilla are different, but those that are revealed more effective I am that Cuban and that Maoist (also with the practical limits that the actors sottolinenano). With the '68 the urban guerrilla develops him transforming her/it "city in a jungle." Particularly the birth of the autonomy (years Seventy) alternate "sabotage and desertion, contempt and resistance to reach to redraw the landscape of the most greater cities." Just in the road of the strategic innovation it stirs the Intifada, an innovation nevertheless abridged.

There where the changes are manifested in more evident way instead - according to the Actors - it is with the birth of the EZLN and the lump movements "the best examples of networked molecular organizations." To such intention, the particular emphasis proposed by the Actors on the innovations of the white overall is of great meaning. These not only apply "some techniques of the civil contempt and the protest he/she doesn't violate" but I am able to create "new expressive forms" what "the networked organization, the spatial mobility and the temporal flexibility."

## APPENDIX B

### Strategy is Revolution of Edgardo Beltrametti

#### 1. The non conventional war

In conclusion the nuclear strategy it is effective only in the confinements of his/her *deterrent* function; it guarantees us the peace "nuclear", but it doesn't resolve the problem of the peace in the world, neither so much less it contributes to settle the sub-judices of international disturbance. Perhaps increase her. The political world continuous to be kept in nervousness from the egoisms of States, from the racial odiis, from the ideological dissents, from the avarice of the man and from the human passions. All sub-judices of depression that cannot become exhausted alone and you/they cannot even find typesetting, if not rarely, through the chatters of the United Nations; so we repeat, hits of megatoni cannot be resolved to. If then is kept in mind, as the protagonists hold in big account, that remains in the actual world a background historical dissent among the states inspired by intentions revolutionary and aggressive and other States that you/they are contested by the first ones for their ideal inspiration of liberty, both with nuclear arsenals, it is evident that among them the relationships of strength follow the

rule to avoid all those military initiatives that could flow in a direct military conflict. Therefore this comparison among the two blockades is evasive militarily, casomai happens for mediate person. Hourly it also has as theater that vast Area where the affairs of the two great contrasted nuclear powers are not vital and it manifest him with local conflicts, for the most part of character guerrillero; hourly the comparison happens to the outside of the nuclear equilibrium through strategic manoeuvres of scarce military content and tall political content. Insofar, in the picture of a lump vision of the world politics, to level of the great powers, it opens a vast field of manoeuvre to this strategy, ampler than that soldier, which involves few to so much the respective allies or satellites or friends, together with the so-called neutral. The manoeuvre can interest the economic plan, when a prominent place occupies him in this sector, so that to force the adversary to bleed himself/herself/themselves in the expensive run to the armaments with the purpose to weaken him/it and to force to treat him/it under conditions of inferiority. You/he/she can be penetrated in breast to the enemy with political means, exploiting the inside contradictions of it with the intent to make the watch lower him or to frustrate him/it, so he prefers the desire of peace to his/her own safety. You/he/she can be maneuvered for the institutions of the adversary to make unsound. You/he/she can be maneuvered so that the allies, the friends and the neighbors that compose the political, economic and strategic space of the enemy, escape to his/her influence or to the collaboration with him. Examples don't be needed. The strategy to which is mentioned here it is practical of every day; the facts that achieve of it happen under our eyes and they are the international chronicles full of it. In this strategic art of the lump revolutionary manoeuvre the communists are the teachers.

Through this new formulation, the war, that the atomic terror seems to make impossible, becomes again possible, believable and "permitted", provided that develops him in the respect of that equilibrium. It strips him of his/her traditional character, primarily military. But it deals with an apparent renouncement, that concerns the tools not the substance. Strategy, strongly politicized, he/she adopts the means that are not those traditional soldiers, even if they are used and arranged as you orchestrate military. There is above all again the fact that the objectives that are wanted to reach are put to fire in different way, we also tell revolutionary way. More than the victory on the field, this new strategy aims to make to collapse the moral defences of the hostile one so that to weaken its reactions, inclusive those military.

## 2. The atomic war

To the beginning of the atomic era, Einstein, in demand as he thought that the third world war would be developed, it said that he/she didn't know him/it but that you/he/she could foresee with certainty that the following war to the bystander would have been fought with the stones. Since then they are spent twenty-five years and more and the answer of Eintein is effective, if someone was decided to press the buttons of the termo-nuclear missiles. What seems very little probable.

The modern strategist is a lot of rights to be himself/herself/themselves in serious embarrassment. You/he/she cannot first of all draw inspiration from some preceding experience. The employment of the two first atomic bombs, of modest power in comparison to those actual, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it constitutes an isolated episode and not an atomic clash. Nevertheless the strategist is fully conscious that a termo-nuclear claim provokes such effects to overcome the finishing line forced of the strategy, that is that to foresee the conditions in which it will occur the victory, as it covers mesne in sight of the organization of the peace. In front of the immense dilapidation of a generalized nuclear war, the real effect that is gotten it is the suicide of all the protagonists of the battle and, probably, an equal fate of the bystanders.

Besides the same strategist, in the phase of the preparation of his/her plans, of forehead is found to a completely new fact, that is added to the drawback just said and it quashes its capability of forecast and synthesis: the base war of nuclear missiles has created such a situation for which the offensive weapons have conquered a decisive, and for now ultimate, prominence on the offensive weapons. In this particular field the technicians' forecasts, of the scientists and of the engineers employees, also being on other pixels in disagreement among them, on this pixel, even though with some different shade, they reach the unanimity and don't offer some indication that this relative prominence of the offensive systems on those defensive can substantially be modified in a reasonable predictable future. The

historical phenomenon that has always accompanied the development of the armaments, that is the precarious and alternate pendulum-like equilibrium between the dart and the shield, marks a keystone that he/she is not known how much it will last. The nuclear strategist, that has called to stretch the operational plans of the war, knows pre-emptive the precariousness of its computations, knows that his/her own logistic-military apparatus is practically to the mercy of the hostile nuclear claim and knows, also, that after the spasm of the first nuclear exchanges, the strategist, if it is still I live, you/he/she has lost the control of that that happens in the immense battleground and it is not even more in the condition to measure the entity of the damages subito over that of those infertis.

From this viewpoint, therefore, to the goals of a conflict that is wanted to contain in his/her human dimension, nuclear strategy is impracticable.

### 3. The chemical and bacteriological war

We have seen that the rigidity of the nuclear weapon has made to evolve the strategy toward a type of *flexible* struggle, stingy of the employment of half soldiers, qual is that that we have called political strategy.

Contrarily, the silent weapons have an opposite fundamental characteristic. The destructive effects on the works of the man are zero. The effects on the men (and on the flora and on the fauna) you/they can be also lethal and particularly repugnant if some aggressive ones or virus are chosen, or if they are used with intention in massive doses. However the address, toward which it stirs the employment in war of the silent weapons, so that it is convenient, it goes to the direction to produce effects dosabili so that is not lethal, also having a weakening and momentary power on the man. In fact in the fan of the silent weapons, there are those with terrible effects of mass as the botulines, for example, and other extremely benign weapons.

The Swede Carl-Goran Heden in "*Unless peace comes*" he/she writes that one hundred saboteurs opportunely vaccinated, you/they could covertly penetrate in a great country as the United States, bringing with itself some pounds of the toxin dictates "botulina" hidden in the belt. "Every of them would go or in a great city or near a plant or near a military center. To a pre-arranged moment, ciascuno would take off from the local airport on a small civil airplane, unlocking, through small and easy headends to be built, his/her own load of botulina to the wind in direction of the objective. An attack of such nature could have provoked human losses since 40 to the 100% of the population. We add, in by theoretical, that the performers of this attack could perfectly remain unknown and to make to revert the liabilities, for example, on the Russian or on the Chinese, with the probability to give the startup to a war of retaliation."

To the opposite extreme of the staircase of the possible effects of the silent weapons, we find the gases lacrimogeni in endowment to all the polices of the world; while between these and the botulines you/he/she can be counted on a big variety of chemical weapons, of biological syndics, of psychic poisons with effects dosabili and enough correspondents to those of time in time desired: more lasting partial and temporary debilitation, overall debilitation, death, insanity, et cetera. Naturally marginal effects can be not you desired: a weakening dose for a healthy person can be lethal for an old man, a pregnant, a patient or a child, and on these same categories an effect that wants to be momentary can become lasting. However it is had to underline that the desirable effect is not never that to produce a massacre comparable to that of the nuclear weapon.

With this he/she is not wanted to say that the silent weapons are humanitarian weapons. Anybody weapon of war is such, for the fact same that is created for going offense to the man, above all when it is conceived and used for getting effects of mass, even though benign. You wants only to assert that these weapons, you use according to criterions exclusively dictated by the efficiency, they offer the possibility to return a dimension to the modern war that the nuclear weapon has made her lose; both because some of these weapons can be dosed in such way by to get a victory without dead, both because as you/he/she is also said, they are *convenient* to the goals of a conquest or a defence advantageous, without damages to the things.

It would be also an illusion to hope that the discovery and the use of new means of offense like the silent weapons to discriminating effects, in absence of slaughters type Hiroshima and type Dresden, has as a result necessary of "to humanize" the war. It is not this way. The new fact is that the silent

weapons offer a choice to the operator: from a side the massive employment of lethal syndics for the killing in mass (as the sued employment of the botulina), with comparable inhuman effects and perhaps more repugnant than the effects of the nuclear bomb; from the other side, the employment of non lethal syndics dosabili with momentary effects. In this sense the war can humanize because the operator, having a choice, you/he/she is invested of a precise liability. If this sense of liability doesn't feel him, these same weapons, in their variety, with momentary weakening direct effects, in hand to an operator without scruples, you/they can lend him to a further strumentalizzazione. We make through the case of an assault a gas, which provokes a momentary state of incapability of 12-24 hours in a small inhabited center or of media greatness, or in a great military establishment. So you/he/she can be hypothesized that, reached the effects incapacitanti, the aggressor immediately intervenes against everybody or a party of the stricken population, propinandole other substances that influence determined forms of mental activity.

“So a called antibiotic puromicina, stops the memory of the distant things but not of those near. Injected in an animal this substance it *allows him to bring defeasible an intense day of job without being able to accrue besides a permanent complex of experiences, of memoirs or of capability* (David Krech, psychologist of the university of the California, 1968). Hourly, the puromicina could be used for example, for producing a race subumana and docile, very similar to one of the social classes biologically determined, described by Aldous Huxley in *The New World*, that he/she anchors ago trentasette years a work of pure imagination you/he/she was considered.”

Other weapons still lean out to the horizon, which you/they don't cheer our future and particularly of the more advanced countries industrially, which, objectively they are those that have, more to lose from an overall war. They are the *climatological* weapons, with which whole continents can be upset, the weapons suboceaniche, the robots to nuclear position and a lot of other anchor that the science offers us and on which possess already a rich literature.

There are however good reasons to believe possible the entry in the art of the war of the silent so-called weapons. The diffused conviction that they will never be employed, doesn't seem us very founded. The testimony of the second world war that he invokes for this thesis, doesn't hold up. A lot of things have been changed since 1945, if nothing else *for the fact that first there was the atomic bomb, which has engraved a gigantic push in the scaling to the destructive power*. Who doesn't have moral scruples to manufacture and to employ the nuclear weapon, doesn't see how can have moral scruples to the employment of the chemical, bacteriological or biological weapons. Besides, the war “possible” today it has different bases from that aborted with the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Finally it is true, that after the second world war the silent weapons are been used, in everybody and two its more extreme varieties: the Egyptians in the Yemen have employed the lethal suffocating gases for the extermination in mass of the monarchic opponents of the regime; the Americans, in Vietnam, you/they have employed those weapons in their more benign variety: the gases lacrimogeni and the defogliantis.

*Today contemplate him to a victory with the material spoiled young persons*. Therefore the silent weapons are suited very well for the revolutionary war, to the secret strategy, winding, provocative, insinuating, pregnant of complicity that has as objective her “the man's apprehension.” Perhaps it is in this direction that needs to perceive the great danger of these weapons: what they is used in depreciation of every sense of liability and without any scruple with the purpose to violate or to zap the personality of the individual, to do I orchestrate him/it some subversion.

Another danger of the silent weapons is also in these two circumstances. Their secret are not such, they are by now of everybody, also of the Countries that don't have international liability, that is driven, or better teleguidati, from a third power that, persecuting thin subversive, them you/he/she can use as tool of provocation.

In according to place these weapons, of immaterial cost and that you/they can be prepared in the small laboratories secret able to escape the most minute control, they are also lent to a handicraft outturn. As you orchestrate decisive of a revolution, of a coup d'état, they promises a lot. The repugnance that verse of them is had, won't last for a long time. Then, as he/she is known, enough that someone starts.

For all these *technical* motives, it would be a bug to exclude tassativamente the employment of the so-called silent weapons, particularly of the nerve-gases, during a conflict or of a civil war. Flexibility, low cost, secrecy, effects dosabili, exclusion of damages to the physical and civil lay-outs they are not

all qualities that make to prefer these weapons to the nuclear weapons?

#### 4. The defence omnidimensionale

The notion of defence, today, as we have already mentioned, you/he/she has become wealthy of content and it occupies or you/he/she should occupy well more than that sector dell government administration that entitles him to his/her name. Very distant it is the time in which was said “the king ago the war”, when this was a personal fact among sovereign potestà, you/he/she was prepared in the closed club of a court or a caste, you/he/she was fought by voluntary-mercenaries against other voluntary-mercenaries; while the generality of the populations remained extraneous of it; it was to it few or nothing party, unless you/he/she was occasionally plundered by undisciplined soldieries, or, still rarer case was damaged to unwind himself/herself/themselves some fight in the same place of the inhabited installation. The French revolution had already made its and Napoleone you/he/she had institutionalized the principle that the war was a compulsory fact. But in the actual times the notion of defence,-that you/he/she is preferred to replace with the notion of “war”-he/she wants to point out very still than the obligation of all the fit citizens to the weapons to participate in the preparation and the carrying out of the war. The “defended” he/she embraces everything and everybody: both the government and the civil population; both the passive subject citizens of the offense, that you/he/she is generalized and multidiniensionale and that you/he/she can assume apocalyptic proportions; both the same as active subjects, which, not only as soldiers, but any is their position in the company, they have called to contribute somehow to I strive him/it some defence.

On the other hand it doesn't need to forget the ideological contrast, shown him incompatible till now, that divides the world. It doesn't exhaust him in to stuff more and more the arsenals of awful weapons and you improves, but it feeds a permanent and overall and multiform revolutionary assault, against which the weapons of the defence debbono also to be of different nature from those that are accrued. It needs therefore to depart from this verification to grab in his/her whole meaning the modern concept of Defence. On the subject Raul Girardet, one of the most acute researchers of the phenomenon of whom we are speaking, teacher to the institute of Political Studies in Paris, writes: “The theorists of the revolutionary war debbono obligatorily, in fact, to insist on the necessity to widen and to renew the same notion of National Defence, what it conventionally comes today still defined. To their eyes you/he/she cannot treat him that of a lump claim, combining in front of the subversive threat, in every moment and in all the sectors of the national activity, of the means of every nature, political, administrative, social, economic and cultural, together with those military. In the actual conjuncture peace cannot be considered that *as a continuation of the struggle with all the means*. As he/she is seen, in the same way that you/he/she is seen already upset by the Soviet military technicians, the famous axiom of von Clausewitz doesn't stop being repeated.” Girardet continues: “The struggle so defined he/she doesn't only suppose a constant mobilization of all the national energies; it also supposes that the Armed forces, put in front of the reality of the *war in the crowd*, stops being the passive tool, that the soldier accepts to take on more complex and ampler liability of those that is been submitted him in the past. With these doctrinal perspectives the soldier and the political one rigorously become inseparable. It is not more possible to delimit their mutual competences, to define what belongs to the one and what belongs to the other.”

The second party of the citation antedates what we will say I approach. That that it interests hourly it concerns the thesis put in evidence by Girardet, that not the notion of Defence has crossed only, and of very, the traditional military border, but that it must be plans on other bases, so that the political component has a conclusive importance is in the phase of the decisions, both in that of the feasance. In this sense we warn a to confuse himself/herself/themselves some two spheres of competence, and, as a result, the to verify him of a mutual control among them, leaving impregiudicato and to the circumstances if it will be the political one to dress the military cloths or vice versa if the soldiers have to replace himself/herself/themselves with the political ones in case of necessity.

We have to depart from the concept more times confirmed that the free countries are the sprite of a lump revolutionary assault, which can assume three separate forms: nuclear, conventional, subversive. This distinction among the three types of offense is grammatical before being substantial, because in

the reality the three forms of offense are among them link or interdependent. The threat represented by the nuclear weapons can serve as medium to a conventional attack, which can be favorite in turn and supported by an assault type subversive. likewise, to safeguard of the safety, the organization of the defence has to hypothesize a nuclear apparatus really, a conventional apparatus and an apparatus antisovversivo. This scheme must be suited for the circumstances, to the doctrine of the State, to the conditions geopolitiche, to the financial possibilities. The country that doesn't have a nuclear armament has to think about different solutions, in this field, from who possesses instead a complete nuclear apparatus; it has that is to hypothesize a type of defence that keeps in mind of this fundamental inferiority. Accordingly it will assume a great importance a defensive organization, which, from a side, you protect the nation from an outdoor assault using himself/herself/itself of sure political alliances and, from the other side, you create the conditions because an assault is difficult from the inside and that however the possible occupation makes from an enemy expensive and precarious.

Sweden, which is certainly the among the neutral countries more well armed, a system of defence is given, called "system of overall defence", separated in four sections: the Armed forces, the civil Defence, the economic Defence, the psychological Defence. From this formulation it comes down an appropriated military organization: maximum integration among the three weapons; wide autonomy to the person responsible of every military region in case of necessity; the possibility of a rapid mobilization (600.000 men mobilitabili in three days); the compulsory military service for all the men from the 19 a 47 years; a series of paramilitary organizations; a generalized passive defence and of avant-garde (the best of the world), with refuges antiatomici for the light shipping (up to 2500-3000 tons), for the airplanes and for the submersibles, and for many military establishments; a very modern armament to a large extent of national manufacture; a suitable military balance (of which 30% spent for the search!). Another neutral country, Switzerland, also it endowed with a military apparatus of all respect, has devoted to the "Defended civil" the greatest attention. It is had to specify that in Switzerland and in Sweden as in England and elsewhere, the concept of "Defended civil" it is not limitative as that vigente in Italy. It is considered a component of the "defended national" and he/she understands all those activities that serve to preserve only not the population from natural calamity, but also and above all from assaults not characterized, inclusive and particularly that psychological to subversive character. To this purpose the federal Department of Justice and Police of neutral Switzerland you/he/she has published *in two million and more than copies*, you give in release to the population, a volume, "Defends her civil", that opens with a preface in which besides it is said: "Each knows what he intends for *national defence* and what its purpose and its demands are: only a strong army, trained for the modern war, you/he/she can discourage a possible aggressor and to guarantee our independence assuring in equal time the neutrality of the State. I citizens that lend military service have received *The book of the soldier*; today, to that book this harvest of reflections and instructions concernenti the *civil defence* places side by side him and destined to all the families since the war of our epoch runs over the whole population. The two works han therefore in common the worry to prepare an effective resistance against whatever attempt, from whatever party comes, to enslave our country." It is continuous: "You also deals with protecting to the shoulders the busy army in the struggle; army and people are, today never, dependent the one from the other; the army cannot withstand if the moral one of the country staggers or you/he/she allows to get depressed. On the other hand the war it doesn't do more only him with the weapons; it is also psychological; it uses-still before the real war operations-of an insidious propaganda, mirante to weaken and to destroy even the wish of resistance; and when the spirit cracks, which will it never be the strength of the arm? (...). The protection of the country doesn't depend more only on the army; soldiers and civilians debbono to operate together; these last ones have called to new assignments. Prepararvisi is needed, because the resistance is not improvised; it will be very more effective as the defenders know anymore the duties that it is they attend and a the halves of which you/they can prepare. Men and women, young people and elderly, this book pertains to us; it warns, it advises, he/she instructs."

This introduction is enough clear and illuminating because doubts are not had on the purpose of the volume. To confirmation, we read together some voices of the index: Departed traitors; Defeatism and pacifism; Propaganda intimidatrice; Apparatus of revolutionary strengths (a chart accompanies him that illustrates the communist way to attack); Elapsed of a revolutionary war; Demoralization and sovversivismo; Disorganizzazione of the political lifetime; Terror, foreign pressures; Coup d'état.

Yugoslavia of Tito, that intends of communist subversion, owing to it his/her native, feeling been threatened to his it flies from the ambitions imperialists of Moscow, especially after ugly August 1968 cecoslovacco, has emanated a lex on the national defence with which is submitted the two-tier assignment to defend the country from the outdoor assault and from the inside assault to the Armed forces. This lex to the art. 7 say: "Nobody has the right to accept or to sign a writ that legalizes the capitulation of the Armed forces. Nobody has the right to accept or to recognize the occupation of the country or a party of it. If an enemy has occupied provisionally the territory, the political-social communities, situated in that busy territory, they will continue the struggle and the armed resistance against the enemy and they will play the orders given by the authorities stewards of to direct the war national defensive in this party of the busy territory." In base to this conception, every Yugoslav citizen, without some exception as every social GROUP and every enterprise debbono to mercilessly fight every prospective aggressor. The "Borba" of Belgrado of June 6 th 1970 wrote: "numerous detachments of the territorial army come him creating every day and million of Yugoslav they receive a training in sight to fight every possible aggressor The same daily paper (August 18 th 1970), under the security "Women, students and boys in the system of the national defence", reporting himself/herself/itself to a Conference on the national defence, he/she wrote that the women "they will be busy especially in a political and paramilitary activity with the purpose to prevent the civil authorities of occupation to firmly take office himself/herself/themselves"; them, the women, "they will physically zap the representatives of the authorities of occupation and their local collaborators."

These provisions protected you against the threat of an assault type revolutionary I taken by two neutral countries and by a neutralistic country, they find (or you/they should find) comparison also in the so-called western countries "busy."

France, Atlantic nation, that with some conceitedness a power nuclear able holds him to handle alone its defence, you/he/she has adopted a system to three dimensions, which he/she understands note her "force de shake", the conventional strengths and the operational territorial defence (Dot). This last has the purpose to stop the assault from the inside and to provide to arrange the resistance m case of occupazone. Some reserves exist in general on the French defensive system. The "force de shake", as you/he/she is already said, it is everything anything else other than a complete tool comparable to that American or to that Russian and even to that British. In according to place French conventional strengths are a great deal a shield meeting place, numerically well below the demands established by the Nato, with an ultramodern and renewed armament not to a goslow rhythm a great deal. The Dot, to which our particular interest is turned, is founded finally upon a little realistic presuppositions, as for instance, the role that it submits to the trade union, in good party in the hands of the communists; a role that consists of participating in the mobilization of the drives of resistance on the metropolitan territory. Nevertheless, our judgment of worth on the French defensive system, is not in contrast with the importance, that France has shown to know how to appraise to give to the globalità of the modern war.

Italy has abdicated the nuclear armament. On the other hand, today, for reason for costs, but also because you/he/she has remained back in the technological field in comparison to the great nuclear powers, Italy has lost the possibility to enter the atomic Club. It makes up for to this deficiency as the most greater party of his/her European allies, with the affiliation to the Atlantic alliance. Around the validity of this hedging, the perplexities that it has Italy are not different from those that few or so much have all the European allies of America, with the alone exclusion of Great Britain that, to have one nuclear apparatus of his, is found Further in a privileged strategic condition in the relationships of its cousins of over-Atlantic. As it is known it deals with a hedging that has a general character and that he supposes to protect Europe in his/her complex. Some doubt rises on the protection of the single countries, because the assessment of the importance of a local assault can be different if you/he/she is seen from Washington or from a capital European.

Also the conventional defensive preparation of Italy is inserted in the picture of the Atlantic strategy. In this picture, our defensive function abridges him to the "south sector", which despite the appearances, it coincides with the metropolitan confinements. The same role of the Marina is subordinate to this function: to defend the Mediterranean routs where they pass our restocking.

Nevertheless, also from this viewpoint, our conventional strengths are below the hypothesized necessities and they are arranged according to a little realistic criterions, not adherent to our situation.

If we had to bring the Italian Armed forces a satisfactory level and to answer to the above-the-line conventional levels-rather antiquated-occorrebbe to duplicate our military balance (with these times!). But the pixel is not this yet.

The countries that enjoy of free institutions meet great difficulties to fight the ideological assault and politics without contradicting his/her own principles: that is to forbid the circulation of the subversive ideas and the to form him of GROUPs around them with declared revolutionary intentions; to put under accusation an individual for his/her political ideas or, worse, to condemn him/it on the base of the intentions that you/they are attributed him (above-the-line practice in the communist regimes).

How to face this war?

We depart from the traditional viewpoint, implying that the defence from the subversion is performed principal of the organs of police. But it is not this way. As principle the police it has *technical* tools to prevent, to protect, to suffocate intentions and subversive deeds when these exclusively find radix and inspiration inside the country, when the subversion and the crime facts against the State don't have linkings, if not occasional, with the outside. Instead the revolutionary assault is a phenomenon that has radices to the outside; a phenomenon that in its great lines and in the mesne and trailing objectives he/she answers to plain tactical and strategic prepared, definite and effected in world picture. The analysis of this phenomenon in his/her globalità and totality, the prevention toward this type of assault that has military and political character and that it manifests him in the field of competence of the overseas politics more than in that of the domestic policy, it puts us of forehead to a complex of activity that you/they escape the police to the police and against this activity, in absence of strategic discernment, you/he/she can take at the most punitive measures and generally late.

Particularly, as it regards the Italian situation of the moment, it is clear that the police, is found however, prevented from developing only not his/her preventive assignment, but also that repressive.

The same question repeats him, even though under a different visual angle, also for the Armed forces, answerable of the military defence of the State, on which the assignment pours again him to defend him/it from the outdoor attacks. Gives the role of liability ampler than the police that have the Armed forces in the field of the Defence, the difficulties that they meets in to carry out their duty of garrison to the integrity of the State, are of wider nature and under certain greater respects of those of the police, when they are found under the conditions to operate in a country in which the Communist Party is not outlaw. In this case military activity develops him in the deficiency of clarity and in the confusion. All know where the enemy is, qual is the nature of the threat that it represents, yet the Armed forces officially ignore both the one and the other. This way it happens that in a world extremely politicized and prey to an ideological frenzy the Armed forces propose to the citizen that is called to the weapons a type of training stratto; they don't show him the enemy that you/they have to fight and that it is found in the house, they don't make him/it conversant of the techniques and the methods that this adopts for preparing the revolution.

Nevertheless, if, for the above-mentioned motives, the permanent and lump assault cannot be prejudiced, hindered, opposed and repressed, neither from the parties, neither from the police, for exclusion and for competence this assignment is up to the Armed forces to which the integrity of the State is submitted, of a party of the population and it, from every attack duct with the weapons, with violent methods or however with assimilable procedures to those military.

The first function of the Armed forces is to constitute a "deterrent", as it is used to say hourly, in how much their only presence, has where a minimum of cohesion and efficiency, from a side you/he/she can dissuade the attempt of attack the political frontiers of the State, from the other side you/he/she can prevent that an inside depression degenerate, that a pseudo-syndical struggle, a political protest, a whatever social nervousness, exploited by the parties of the subversion, turns him into an insurrection and takes a revolutionary fold.

On the other hand it is unlikely a great deal that the political authorities dare to ask the intervention of the Armed forces in case of serious perturbamenti of the public order or an insurrectionary state. But done admit that such order came adto, it would have feasance? The answer is done of uncertainties.

We finally owe us to ask if an intervention of the Armed forces against a subversive claim arranged of a certain importance were effective in absence of a severe and appropriate of the pictures of all the

degrees and the departments. The answer to this question will be given more before.

The second function of the armed forces is, over that in to make a soldier of the citizen that goes to the weapons, also in to contribute that that citizen is a good citizen, that has conscience of the danger that community races to which belongs, that I/you/he/she am conscious of his/her own duties toward the Country. Since the actual trap mantles him of democracy, the Armed forces you/they should instruct and to train only not the soldier to the use of the weapons that you/they shoot, but also to beware himself/herself/themselves of the deception of the forgeries prophets of the liberty, so that you learn to recognize himself/herself/themselves in the liberty of the Institutions and not in the models that of the liberty, of all the liberties kill at random.

These two functions can be considered as normal activity of the Armed forces. Because in this case to States you Increase and to the whole hierarchy you/he/she is allowed to show the enemy, to characterize the threat to make sprite of it of training of the departments, to give precise notions to the pictures on the nature of the danger and on the way of individualizing the trap. In other words this means to give an ideological content to the training and politicized, which allows only to fight the revolutionary war in all of his/her aspects of struggle army and brought closer, of modern struggle that uses techniques and modern methods.

From these circumstances of done it is necessary to take the movements to reestablish the primary function of the Armed forces, what tool of the Defence. We have already said that the *hostile* operations of which it speaks feed him in the inside plot and they threaten the integrity of the State and the nation, but they obey a lump strategy of world dimension.

In other words it imposes him the necessity that the inside defence, against an enemy that acts in base to a lump strategy, is comforted and arranged on the base of a strategic service of information, that such service is penetrating until where possible is and is practiced in stand-alone way and in narrow collaboration with the allies. It doesn't need to confuse this investigation of great political-military relief with the traditional espionage. What is wanted it is to individualize the strategic choices of the enemy, to know with a certain degree of exactness his/her objectives of the moment and the way with which it intends to reach them; it it is necessary to know its movements so that to foresee in time possible initiatives that interest Italy; it is necessary to know up to that pixel the enemy would be prepared to risk for getting the success to our house and to know what type of success he desires; it it is necessary to know on what men of our house the enemy intends to lean on himself/herself/themselves and on what connivances it counts. Of great help to prepare the defence it is elsewhere the analysis of the movements of the busy enemy, to learn its methods and therefore to be prepared to counter them. It is also important to observe as ours greater allies they behave toward the common enemy when they are directly busy in a conflict type revolutionary against it. It has to be a constant working hypotheses for the technicians of the Defence to consider the eventuality of a conflict armed with modern type in our house; therefore all the strategic information that a shrewd Greater State can pick up are as many jewels tools to prevent the revolutionary dangers and therefore to prevent the civil war.

It results therefore clear that only the Armed forces and any other Body of the State, are or you/they should be you equip for developing these assignments being the armed forces for tradition and necessity the strategic eye of the State. But it is not enough. The confinements to be protected, as we have said, they are not territorial only, rather the more threatened are those that pass inside the national company. It is born of here the indication that the objective of base consists in to watch over and in to recognize the active or prospective syndics, to individualize the relationships that the people have with the outside discover their near and distant sketches and their political complicities. A job of infiltration in the inside subversive organizations is therefore a necessity. Of other song is as many necessary, also for the motive that will appear I immediately approach, to recognize the loyal citizens, which are in condition and able to represent, in case of necessity, the sure elements on which to count; city that must be picked up on the national plan, particularly those that have lent military service. Not being able himself/herself/itself to discard the hypothesis of a revolutionary insurrection, that has been successful in a wider party to of the national territory, the Armed forces debbono to be prepared to make you forehead.

Therefore it it is necessary to preventively give lifetime to a parallel Greater State, compound of

soldiers and of civilians, which, in the area “busy”, acting in the clandestinity, handles to mobilize the apparatus (clandestine) predisposed, formed by sure citizens, among which some trained to the war of guerrilla. This apparatus will have financial means, of materials of equipment, of backup provisions in equipped secret bailments. To say the truth an initiative of this nature, which has not overcome the experimental phase, has been taken in Italy in a limited Area of the oriental territory.

When it speaks of defence it also it is necessary to think about the worse. To schedule the failure is performed some Most greater State. You/he/she can happen that the whole national territory or party of it escapes the control of the authorities of the State and that however a precarious situation is created for the operation of the power. During the second world war some governments have had the sad experience not to have predisposed only not in advance an apparatus of local resistance of which or was said hourly, but also a place of sure refolding, on the same national territory or in allied territory, of all that organs in which it assembles him the legality and the authority. This way it is opportune and necessary, in the most cautious and farsighted way, to take fit measures to a refolding of such organs, which is not representative only, but edged of departments armed with a certain consistence, so that to make more eye-catching and it embodies the wish to maintain the continuity of his/her own legality and authority. They are measures of great plight that cannot be improvised.

The role of the Armed forces in breast to the Defence also runs over ampler problems, that are parallel to the political problems, in the sense that the outdoor safety, which is condizionante the inside safety is more guaranteed if the bordering countries don't constitute a prospective threat.

From all of this the great importance that you/they have the services of intelligence emerges.

They are services that cannot be submitted to other organs that is not the institute of the Armed forces for many and intuibili you motivate. He is not able in fact to leave in the hands of the “political” you list him of those people that are designate to constitute the nucleuses of resistance and you don't even list him of those people who are suspected of revolutionary aims. As principle, any different organ of the Armed forces is equipped to guard the proper strategic secret and those of the alliance and any other organ it is able to take initiatives in the field of the near and distant strategic defence, also to avoid the danger to arouse alarms and to give interpretations place been wrong.

To these criterions, here hardly rough, understood to see the assault in his/her nearer hypothesis to the reality, it doesn't correspond the actual organization of the defence in Italy and particularly it doesn't correspond the military apparatus with his/her doctrinaire and human content. This fact constitutes a sub-judice, perhaps the first one, for which the Italian Armed forces are unprepared, technically and conceptually, to make forehead to a type of assault “not orthodox”, against which the traditional armaments, also admitting that is the best, the most appropriate and numerically enough, they serve to little.

We have said a sub-judice but not the alone if our military organization is not prepared for a modern war. The other sub-judices are innumerable, ancient, new and new and it would be necessary to go up again back many decades and to stop for a long time himself/herself/themselves on the actuality for hunger an exhaustive analysis. Italy has never shone for a politics coherent soldier and adherent to his/her overseas politics, also when this was not inhaled by great ambitions. Looking at our second war enterprise of this century, after the Turkish conflict, in 1915 we have entered war against those powers that had been for a long period our allies and therefore with an almost overall unpreparedness. Then the things were repaired (also because beside to us there were the masters of the oceans), but to expenditures of what sacrifices and of what massacre. In the second world war our more deficient preparation was wrong. Our formulation and studded of bugs without exculpations. In the postwar period the reconstruction of the Armed forces was not the fruit of one meditated politics. You followed the criterion of the recovery of all the retrievable, instead of gathering the good buy to do it tabulates shaves, to depart from zero and to reconstruct afresh all. We dragged behind instead there very personal disappointed, ancient useless incrostazioni, old methods also in the government of the personnel, establishments of the time of You Marmora. The choice that was done then, also driven by an impassioned minister of military things and that a good memory of itself left, it became an additional difficulty in front of the sopravvenientis necessity of the times, which asks for modern lay-outs, they impose a continuous modernization of them and a constant updating of the materials and the pictures. Above all the mentality, despite the efforts of the shrewdest Generals, he/she remained anchored to old schemes, dragging himself/herself/itself behind that so much of trionfalismo and of vanity that is really

of the Italian custom.

These sfasatures must be debited only to the soldiers partly. To the origin of them there is a political class, which has often made to climb to the places of vertex of the Armed forces whom you/he/she is not professionally prepared anymore, but it is more docile to the political suggestions or, naturally, who can boast of partisan worths, often acquired in the convents or withdrawing himself/herself/itself on the impervious tops where the tourism and the fear won her/it on the courage. The effects of these wrong, puzzling and discouraging choices, are very more serious than believes him. In one "company" dam as that serve in the military the relative phenomenons they have demonstrations and more eye-catching and deeper consequences. A mediocrity or mismanagement to the vertex of a great firm can find some correctives in factors that impose alone him, because they are born from the continuous comparison with the outside, they are born from the mobility of the mesne managing pictures from the implacable laws of the Market and the competition. In the order of the military things, the only concrete criminal evidence of a good person or mismanagement it is the war, when that is the remedies are by now late, even impossible, however tragically expensive. A mediocrity or a bad head in the military order only it doesn't build not, but it is also carrier of an example diseducante on the whole hierarchy, on the inferior ones of degree, which, not being able anything to learn in the military art of the command from the superior, they imitate the methods of it, that is they learn to manage in the immobilism to shift nuisances and to make career. We don't owe therefore us to surprise if we come upon there in heads which exchange the desires with the reality. Come above for virtue of combos in the subsequent years the defeat, you/they have not had a true experience of war in places of command of relief and so much less they own those technical and cultural knowledges that are required to an officer that has to maneuver modern means and that I/you/he/she am able of the government of a well different personnel and for many verses more evolved than that of once. I am quality, instead, that find him rather in the folds of the career and in the new levers of officers; quality almost instinctively, more than in the Schools; stimulated by a problem list that it springs from the facts of every day and in which a sort of implied when loyal confrontation is not absent toward human, organizational and hierarchical lay-outs, by now out time.

Unfortunately, also in this sector, the initiatives he/she took in Italy are not deprived of confusion. For the memorials reasons, he is very timid, not to say more, to insert in the training of the soldier the theme of the "psychological war." So much more than, gives the military mentality and the scarce cultural plight of the Italian environment to understand the problems of the modern war, many they see in this type of training an intention of civil war, while, contrarily it deals with getting ready himself/herself/themselves to avoid her/it. This way, as it regards the so-called military psychology, you/he/she is refolded on the solo theme of the psychological claim. But the evidence and the good sense tell that the two moments, psychological war and psychological claim, are among them interdependent and that ignoring two the one, he falls in the fanciful one. It deals with an understood training to correspond to the necessities of war or as such nothing or few it is worth to strengthen the defences (psychological claim) and to neglect the offense (psychological war). We premise that it is necessary not to make himself/herself/themselves too illusions around the employment of the military psychology to create a good soldier. It cannot replace the ideal bases on which it backs the military institute of a nation. Awry of the military psychology, that is one "tool", it is had to everything seat the ethical problem of the Armed forces and immediately after the problem of the military organization within which, note, the training must be seated with its purposes and the armament that I/you/he/she am proper for the same purposes.

With the advent of the republican State (remainderman of the Monarchy for penalty of referendum) and with the insertion of the State in those vast interdependences, that are a characteristic of our epoch, the soldier has to also draw its inspiration from other concepts over that from that formal of the fidelity to the Head of the State; it has to have conscience of his/her own duty of protagonist of the defence and a protagonist that is found of forehead to a multiform threat that burdens on the State. In fact, as we have said, the function of the Armed forces in the western countries is not more only that to arrange an apparatus for the *physical* defence of the State, but also that of the defence against the revolutionary permanent perturbations, which make party of our world and they aim note to zap that type of State, to which the soldier has called to vest safety and continuity.

This *excursus* on the historical circumstances, once more it points out the new conception of the

Defence and it helps us to understand how much it was said first around her “military psychology”, particularly around the “azione psychological.” This last is not a novelty; you/he/she has always been practiced in breast to the Armed forces in every time, even though with other names and not in systematic way as hourly., But, to start from the second world war, has assumed today a greater and increasing importance, both for the environment strongly politicized and full of ideological messagings that the soldier surrounds; both for the threats onnidirezionali that makes to weigh on the State the development of the revolutionary war, both finally to consolidate the new relationships between soldier and State in that countries where, for sundry sub-judices, a revolutionary shift of the Institutions is verified. Completing the training with the psychological claim, it makes him the soldier aware of the sorting orders of the State, are immunized him/it by the hostile propaganda, him he does warned of the threat coming from the inside and from the outside for work of syndics to which it is granted to spread ideas, to form and to sustain GROUPs or parties to take initiatives inspired by the outdoor enemy.

Done it is that after the experience of the second world conflict and the effects that are derived of it, all the European Armed forces, especially those of the countries where the war has left deeper traces, you/they have heard the necessity to intensify the “azione psychological”, to give vigor to the moral content of the soldier. They don't even make exception the Armed forces in which there were no lightning storms constitutional, because also these countries as Great Britain, are not immune from alarming political restlessness, which, produced by ideological distorsions, they put actually in discussion the duties of the citizen to yesterday undisputed. It is a phenomenon of great relief that cannot be ignored from the Defence and from his/her operational tool, that is the Armed forces. Therefore to the “psychological claim” they are interested directly all the soldiers on call and all the citizens that can have called to the weapons and anchor all those people that somehow they participate as producers or creative of good and of services to the plight of the Armed forces. A look to what does elsewhere him in this sector can be useful. We set the case of Federal Germany. Germany, after the end of the second world conflict it is that that has devoted in Europe more attention to this aspect of the military psychology. Also France has especially had an interesting experience in this field during the war of Algeria; however it deals with an experience that many pixels of contact don't have with the Italian situation. In the Federal Republic of Germany the problem introduced him in all of its vivacity since the moment in which in that country the rearmament was decided; so much that close to the times concernenti the sorting order, the tactic, the logistics, etc. it appears in the Bundeswher a new called discipline “Innere Führung.” The expression doesn't find a spot-on match in Italian, you/he/she could approximately be translated her/it as “internal abearance.” The Innere Führung has been so defined: “The whole dispositions destined to maintain in the Armed forces a style of democratic lifetime and to assure the civic and moral training of the soldier.” In other words in Germany it dealt with promoting in first place another conception of the soldier, that was in antithesis with that militarist hitleriana, authoritarian, antidemocratic (in turn direct remainderman of the imperial Armed forces, passing through the bracket “democratic” of the Republic of Weimar). You treated in according to place to set the Bundeswher out of the nationalistic picture, to the service of ideal European sovranazionali, to do her/it conscious of the ideological character of the war and that therefore it has to possess the reflexes to reject all the attacks, armed and psicopolitici, to the frontiers of the State and the inside liberty. Undoubtedly the Innere Führung contains a noteworthy polemic position toward the recent past, which however you/he/she has gone attenuating himself/herself/itself in the years with the entry on the scene of the new levers detached by the nazionalsocialismo. However, apart every consideration of worth, you/he/she is admitted from all the observatories you don't suspect of bias that, in sight of the purposes that proposed him, the Innere Führung has given positive results. In France it was sprite of study and great interest and you/he/she has received many enthusiastic consensus in the pictures of the Armée. Nevertheless on this almost unanimously of opinions it is necessary to make a precise statement that only he/she apparently hijacks us from the theme of the military psychology and particularly from his/her aspect of “psychological claim.” If the depth renewal looks him-a real revolution-verified him in breast to the western German Armed forces in sense antimilitarist, the Innere Führung has undoubtedly gotten a success. If it looks him instead at the degree of efficiency of the Bundeswher, if it looks him at the quality of the personnel-official, noncommissioned officers and troop-to the spirit of sacrifice, and if these qualities are compared to those that possessed the military apparatuses that have preceded the Bundeswher in Germany, the judgment of the observatories has to be more cautious. In France, where

as the Innere Führung you/he/she is said you/he/she has aroused admiration, some critical soldiers believe that the Bundeswehr, apart the level of the conventional armaments that possesses and the number of the strengths, that you/they make her/it the strongest line up of earth among all the western European countries, leaves some doubt on its operational consistence. Because, in last analysis, the abrupt renouncement to certain values, is paid. You does in fact debit to the Bundeswehr to have pictures that allow to desire and this is because the economic comfort and the hedonism dilagantes of the actual German company dissuade the best young people from the career of the weapons, both because the old pictures, already reduced by the war and by the purge, they are by now at the street of depletion because of to pursue some years. Besides also the level of the recruits and the reconfirmed ones is relatively low. Many are the motives legally allowed to refuse himself/herself/themselves from the compulsory military service and, exceptions excepted, also gives the shortage of experts in the sectors of the industry, only the least resourceful young people generally form the base of the recruitment.

But in I break down him/it of these deficiencies, that could find remedy, there is a sub-judice that must not be neglected and that it is perhaps the most important; a sub-judice that must be seated to the origin of the new Armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany; a sub-judice that the spirit of the Bundeswehr depresses and that the Innere Führung cannot contribute to settle, because it is a political sub-judice.

The Bundeswehr was born in the presupposition that an offensive war tool would ever have become *even in sight of the craved Germanic reunification*. So, in a separated nation, that feels him oppressed in one of his/her parties, after the heavy paid tribute already with the forced assignment of vast territories lived by Germans and traditionally German, to the Armed forces to which prohibition is done to think about the reunification of the Country, you/he/she is escaped anything of main point and anybody else spells, however noble it is, it will appear secondary or marginal. The moral rush of these Armed forces will be clipped, stimuli won't be able whether to be a po artificial and not without some reserve. This consideration doesn't want to play criticism to the choices that the Germans of the west have done, he/she is wanted only to put in relief that the biting one some Armed forces you/he/she can be completed with a systematic and harmonic psychological treatment, but this cannot replace the ideal solicitations.

We return to our matter. We have said some success, with relative reserves, of the Innere Führung in Germany. We add that we cannot think or to desire to transfer the same experience, sic et simpliciter, in Italy because of the difference of the human environment. Nevertheless you give some analogies around the conditions in which Italy and Germany were found at the end of the conflict aborted in 1945, the German experience in subject you/he/she can give us some precious indications on the psychological claim in the Armed forces.

Also in Italy there was, even though with times and routine different, a depth change in the sorting order of the State; also in Italy you/he/she is occurred a new and precise international orientation that has modified the traditional data of the Defence. Also in Italy, as everywhere, tener is owed account of the shifts intervended in the tactical and strategic behavior of the war. The oath to the Chairman of the Republic has a certain dose of abstraction; it has for sprite a function more than a person, which in fact it periodically changes. The election of the Head of the State is served as the Parliament, that is, in last analysis from parties and from a majority that for his same definition can change. The institutional value of this majority can have put in discussion , because in that majority it nests a party that is against the State. Besides the vote of the Head of the State happens in according to degree and it doesn't mirror with vigor the popular wish, even if *formally* this is true. We want to say that the oath to the Chairman of the Republic leaves a margin of interpretation of the national wish. Which wish, is embodied also finally on the background choices that recall him to the traditions, and that I am the fruit of a historical vocation. From this viewpoint the bond of the Armed forces with the State and with the nation is in a certain ampler sense of the oath of fidelity that they pronounces; it corresponds to a space wider than they occupy or you/they should occupy the Armed forces in breast to the national community; it corresponds to you determine functions that are up to them for obligation really and stand-alone, in how much those functions obey mandatory choices and responsibly recognized.

Therefore the psychological claim, if he/she wants to be consistent with herself and therefore to reach the efficiency, cannot ignore that the plight of the Armed forces has to also find base on a precise

vision of the position of Italy. It also achieves of it that the Armed forces are found embedded in a great political-military alliance (with a certain degree of integration that should increase), which hocks her to withstand the assault of the weapons, but also to the assault of the propaganda, of the political espionage, of the infiltration, of the armed and manufacturing sabotage, of the ideological bickering. Having the war assumed this character, it is evident that they are required to the Armed forces reflected appropriate.

In this sense the *Innere Führung* could constitute an experience to imitate and to adopt. To suit for our mentality and historical situation. To imitate in the method, that is present tener that the *Innere Führung* has been introduced in all the folds of the military lifetime. As many the psychological claim must have felt in every petition of the military lifetime and in every moment, hourly in fluorescent way, hourly in discreet way: possession a great influence in the relationships between Armed forces and nation, between superior pictures and subordinates, between officers and troop and in breast to the troop. The psychological claim should finally have an anchor greater importance on the abearance of the military hierarchy to the superior levels. We intend to say what it has to serve to specify to that level that the Armed forces have some duties that transcend, especially in you determine circumstances, the professional assignments properly, to focus himself/herself/themselves on the decisions to take when the nation *however is* in danger. If the tacit Pact, of which or was said hourly, among is republican and Armed forces were broken for political liability, the Armed forces they have not the right but the duty to draw its consequences, to oppose himself/herself/themselves to create him some conditions of a civil war and to oppose himself/herself/themselves in all the ways, if these have lost the sense of their warrant or if you/they have overcome that confinements of decency within which the dialectics of the power freely develops him.

Italy cannot face a war event without a military organization that has means suitable to the inside revolutionary danger. With this he/she is not wanted to bastardize the existence, even though doubtful, of a danger coming from the outside; but an attack from the outside will ever occur without the concurrence of attempts guerrilleros from the inside. Accordingly the danger of assault from the outside is remote, how much more it is to exclude the concurrence of the inside revolutionary strengths. Besides it is not completely true that a conventional assault can exclusively be jammed from conventional strengths. Especially those people which are able and debbono to count on sure and powerful allies-what us h promises the Atlantic politics-they know that a conventional attack can be delayed and neutralized with forms of struggle, which combine the guerrilla with the intervention of mobile organic drive. Waiting for the military and diplomatic intervention of the allies.

A correct solution would ask for the approntamento of two apparatuses, complementary the one to the other, one conventional and the other antirivoluzionario. To this solution the tall cost opposes him, disproportionate to our balance. Combining these two apparatuses without proportionate means, one-legged solutions they would be gotten only. Once more the example of France it assists us. This country is given a military sorting order that foresees, besides that nuclear, two apparatuses, the one conventional, the other antirivoluzionario. The result is. what the French conventional device is well below how much necessary would be for satisfying the plans of the Shape (to which France has escaped besides); while the regulating antirivoluzionario (Dot) it is anymore a project that a reality. It is necessary therefore to see our defensive possibilities under a new light that allows us a cautious and definite choice. Considering the inside danger as priority and condizionante, a rigid apparatus and located as the actual one, lined up in prevalence on the oriental frontier, inspired to defensive criterions and operational criterions of the "field battle", you/he/she must be remised. It is necessary instead to vest the maximum mobility and at the same time the maximum adherence to the ground of the operational strengths. The strengths of bump must be located in a "sanctuary" sets in an area reasonably by the course of the hostile conventional weapons. In hand strengths are assembled and mobile, is inspired to a model as that of the First American Distribution of Cavalry eliotrasportata, already working in Vietnam. Italy is to the fourth place the world as builder of helicopters and is able to furnish the instruments.

In obedience to the new operational concepts, the apparatus defensive military Italian has to be connected with the national company so that to be able to pick up all the citizens in the lists of mobilization in sight note of the more complexes and capillaries performed that they are up to the

Defence. The principal purpose of this mobilization makes possible to prepare fit plans to capillarily stop every more connected revolutionary effort with the outside and still allows to individualize those people that give enough surety of loyalty to make some departments particularly stewards of to fight the revolutionary war and, in the case, to constitute the strength of resistance in case of hostile occupation.

Against the assault located on the confinements, our reaction won't be type rigidly or only conventional. If not in case of sure success, the battle is not accepted; they are accepted instead and smaller clashes are looked for, especially there where you/they can intervene with claim of surprised our mobile drives. In case of apparent superiority of the enemy, waiting for the concurrence of the allies, the assignment to extinguish the hostile rush touches to the organization local antirivoluzionaria with operations of strangulation, of sabotage, of attacks to the margins and the shoulders. A defence so conceived, to brought closer distances, of model guerrillero, provided that is prepared with big care, it also mends us from nuclear attacks, since our strengths are mixed with those some enemy. The damages, in a battle conducted with these criterions, compared to those that a conventional battle provokes, they would be less serious a great deal in human losses and in good and destroyed wealths.

In the areas occupied by the enemy, the clandestine defensive system, composed by a net of bases and bailments secret, it creates the conditions for the revenge, it doesn't give peace to the collaborators, it arranges operations, it strikes the hostile heads, it develops the propaganda, he/she offers Aid to the populations. To the guide of this complex it systematizes, in which the civil population has a function paritaria close to the military strengths, an integrated and mixed Greater State you/he/she must perfectly be set, that is compound of soldiers and civilians, well articulated in capillary branches and with launchings and sure linkings.

This doctrine strikes again him on the armament, to make him/it proper for the clashes that their intervention makes possible and rapid. In general it deals with potentially adopting rustic weapons, that doesn't want to say surprises or antiquated, but that serves to the brought closer struggle, that you/they can be built in great series, with characteristics that underline the mobility rather than the power to loss of the mobility. Putting to profit the ingeniousness of Italians, a great effort you/he/she would be done for picking up inventors, engineers and technicians so that studies weapons and a devices and a specific halves of every nature for this type of war. In the chapter of the armaments we have also mentioned to the chemical war; agreement in the sense that we have described her as war "humanitarian" because not necessarily deadly. This armament should not also be neglected.

The armament to which here refers us doesn't require neither fittingses gigantic neither expensive searches neither long times too much between the planning and the outturn in series. Our actual manufacturing organization is able of recepire, with some initial effort, this address, in forecast of a specialization more and more push in this sector. You could create this way a manufacturing sector that devoted him to the manufacture of a great variety of this type of armament you would hold, maritime and airplane, which could find an interesting international Market. For the tactical employment on the ground aerial manageable and of little cost as high-speed and light maritime means, means of carriage on road and of communication abundant you/they can bring the trap and to escape the trap, linked tener the GROUPs with greater effectiveness of more expensive, bulkier, more sophisticated and very numerous means. Where the line up are intermingled, the tactical field can be saturated with the quantity and with the presence of a slender aviation, proper for to develop nighttime claims of surprise, in linking with claims coming from the sea and earthly claims. Territorial Organization and a halves of this type can create a net inextricable guerrigliera around the enemy, that stirs with conventional means.

The necessities of the other type of heavy armament, adopting this doctrine, they decrease, but they don't disappear. On the sea it doesn't come I lead the problem of free tener the routs and to maintain a level of such strengths to compete with other people's fleets. The cruisers don't be justified by 6500 tons, while our Marina is scarce of light shipping and of submersibles, of which we would have so much need. However an inspection of the lay-out of our Armed forces of sea seems necessary.

A light and rustic aviation, numerically abundant, able to saturate the tactical field, cannot exclude the necessity of an aerial fleet that somehow, assembling himself/herself/itself, guarantees the aerial predominance in a determined moment and in a determined pixel. But also in this case we could not pretend to do from us. It is an illusion to hope that we can build us an aviation of attack of modern level. Our technological patrimony in the aerial sector, which for a season not so much breve brought us to the first places in the world, you/he/she has gone dispersed. The pieces miss to reconstruct him/it,

the means they would miss us to produce an aerial fleet that has the possibility to be to comparison with the outturn of the American or Russian aeronautical industry. We can continue, as you/he/she is done till now, to look for near the foreign industry the best and the possible one in relationship to our finances and in relationship to other people's availability to furnish us some weapons that we desire to have, wishing us that is allowed to maintain to a level of acceptable training a proportionate number of our pilots there and counting that in case of depression the allies furnish us the most modern cars in measure of our necessities. Nevertheless it is to repeat well that this dependence from the foreign countries in the aerial field, doesn't concern the means that we can build, what the helicopters and other light instruments for the intervention in the tactical field.

We have wanted here to point out only some pixels of the changes that according to us they would be possible and desirable to modernize the military apparatus. In this way a lot of old harness, useless, expensive, that hock many strengths, you/they would be eliminated. Many savings would be made by to destine to the training, to the study, to the acquisition and the manufacture in Italy of new weapons; you/they could serve to rimpolpare the balance of the Marina, that operates in a bitter less and less our and to hold our more up-to-date aerial fleet of attack and more fed than is hourly it. To seem not very different the admiral Birindelli seems to be, that has relaunched a letter to the printout, in which, after having underlined the obsolescence of the Italian military apparatus, he writes that, considered the allotment of the military balance, "the least worse solution and that by now he imposes you/he/she is that to adjust the strength of the departments and the lay-outs to the allotments, modernizing, reducing, repurchasing in training and power that that would be spent less in dimensions. To this background remedy numerous other provisions of reform should be placed side by side that in their whole you/they should guarantee to the *service* of the Defence an elevated functional efficiency and therefore a real utility and a real prestige."

To conclude, this, that we have exposed, appears us the road to modify our military apparatus so that to put him/it in condition to face the third dimension of the war, to which Italy is more exposed without besides forgetting the emergent necessities from the outdoor attacks. Another advantage of this transformation is that automatically it would have the consequence to favor the insertion of the Armed forces in the national structure and these to supply him, it happens hourly as, near the national industry, feeding is her/it with their technological letters of request, both with their factors. Other consequences would derive from these premises consequences of moral and psychological order. Giving an organic accomodation to the organization of the Defence, creating a new relationship between Armed forces and national company, the loyal citizen, in case of necessity, it would find the proper place not to be isolated and submerged by arrange subversive minorities and you/he/she would not even be tried to replace himself/herself/themselves with the State to defend himself/herself/themselves from the inside duresses.

## APPENDIX C

### Guerrilla, CONTROGUERRIGLIA And ESERCITOdel Gen. Luigi Salatiello

#### 1. Premise

The to bloom of ideas, the desire of originality, the pretence to believe new what instead the increasing interest is old that, under to pursue some political events in which peace and war touch him and they confuse him, it manifests the public estimation for the military things and the consequent vulgarization of knowledges that once they were exclusive patrimony of the "technical", if from a side positive phenomenons must be considered, from the other one they behave for the Pictures the hazard of perplexity, of uncertainties, of susceptible conceptual deformations to more ever crack today the unitarietà of professional thought essential and, therefore, to address on wrong binary the activity addestrativa and, if the time played, the operational decisions.

From what I husk it exists, you/he/she is always happened that in the inside of a State it was tried to demolish the political regime in vigor to necessarily establish not best one of it different.

The long iter which is reached to the conquest of the power is characterized in way how much never variable, neither the days for grace with which he is accustomed to designate him/it, coup d'état, insurrection, revolution, subversion, is indicative of a clean difference in the formalities.

The history offers us innumerable examples of inside subversions, examples that not only differentiate him for the methods adopted by their actors, but also for the motives from which these had moved. Unfortunately we don't have the time, neither it reenters besides in the purposes of the present lecture, to conduct a specific investigation on the subversive war. We abridge there to ascertain that in our epoch it almost always nourishes him of ideological motives and it appeals only to the armed claim when the work of psychological erosion and the technique of infiltration in the places key of the government apparatus has not been enough to scalzare the regime to the power.

You shapes so a type of war that can ignite in concomitance or not with that traditional both it General or local, nuclear or conventional, and that from this it diversifies him for the followings principal motives:

- aim to the overthrow of the regime vigente in a Country;
- it generally has an ideological content;
- it is born, he develops and it politically concludes him in the inside of a State with the backing or less than similar foreign powers to the revolutionary movement;
- you/he/she can turn without makes him necessary the petition to the weapons;
- it uses, if resorts to the weapons, essentially of the guerrilla, also without excluding the behavior of real operations in great style.

Until here as it regards the traditional war, independently from his/her extender (General or local) and from his/her physiognomy (conventional, nuclear potential, nuclear active). But it is in the subversive war that the guerrilla finds the ideal environment, it shapes him in all of its poliedricità and it rises to the role of only military component of the war phenomenon. Here prepared by long hand, and clearly characterized on the political plan, it can remain to the prospective state if the claims of propaganda and infiltration are enough to realize the destruction, as it are able, if decidedly opposed in an opposition that also in this case it is fratricidal war, to gradually turn himself/herself/themselves into real operations, of more conspicuous so more classical style as the outdoor backing will become on which confide generally the promoters of the insurrection.

*In conclusion*, throwing spins her, we can say that the guerrilla is a form of particular struggle whose role oscillates among two extreme poles:

- of concurrence to the operations of the regular army is it really or hostile;
- of only military component of a movement of resistance against a foreign occupation or of a war of subversion.

## 2. Genesis of the guerrilla

1. If it operates in the context of a classical war the guerrilla you/he/she can be born for spontaneous germination or to be enabled by the parties to which it benefits.

The spontaneous germination of patriotic nature manifests him for the army that acts in his/her own territory, while that that is expressed to profit of a foreign army nourishes him, primarily, of motives for political-social character.

2. In the subversive war we don't find again the differentiations and the shades that in the war classical damage a certain complexity to the origin of the guerrilla. This, intervening-according to a mechanics repeatedly experimented, even if not always with success-only when the phases of propaganda and infiltration tactics of the subversive trial have guaranteed her favorable conditions, you/he/she is always provoked and carefully predisposed.

## 3. Characteristics of the guerrilla

Indeed what characterizes the guerrilla, as he/she is deduced by the preceding considerations, it is

that it has to have a sub-judice, a correct sub-judice or at least apparently such, of effortless understanding and able for his/her strength of suggestion to inflame the minds.

Under this aspect you/he/she cannot be denied that the social wallpaper ideologies are more strongly today felt by the popular masses than doesn't happen for the concepts, noble certain but abstracts, that feed the patriotism. That's why, we return on this key, wanting, as it appears necessary in the present time, to foresee to enable claims of guerrilla for the really working army in the national territory, it is necessary to individualize fit themes to concretize and to shape according to modern and suggestive formulas the traditional one and always effective feeling of the love of country.

Role and field of claim of the guerrilla can considerably widen in two hypotheses, besides well different the one from the other.

The first one is identified in to grow stronger himself/herself/themselves and to stretch himself/herself/themselves of the movement of resistance to which poc'anzi was mentioned, that, united to grow week himself/herself/themselves some strengths of occupation in consequence of the unfavorable one elapsed of the general conflict, allows to turn the guerrilla into operations in great style conducted by orderly drive according to usual and obedient schemes to the canons of the traditional tactic, if not-of it riparleremo-to those of the strategy.

We observe, for instance (but it deals with a very meaningful example) that, if the inhabitants' attitude in the party of national territory occupied by a hypothetical invader pits to these favorable, not only trust could not be made on a spontaneous movement of resistance but the possibilities of claim of leave regular drive or you transports in site they would be how much never aleatory.

#### 4. Phases of the controguerriglia

Some conversants distinguish three phases in the development of the controguerriglia:

- the organization, that can be to a large extent preventive when the guerrilla manifests him in territories where his to rise up and its repression has been anticipated since the time of peace, adopting the measures of the case;
- the tutorship of the liberty of claim of the body of principal battle and, for extender, of an orderly carrying out of the civil lifetime;
- the behavior of the turned offensive operations to the annihilation of the guerrilla.

As it regards the first pixel, the turbulence of today's world, of which the aggressiveness of the revolutionary or totalitarian parties is principal sub-judice but not only, the contrasts among the social classes fed by less economic motives not cha from ideological reasons, the affievolimento of the national conscience-baited by the noble one but for now utopian aspiration to a humanity without frontiers-, recognizes her/it utility of the guerrilla in the general balance of the 2° world conflict, the role-often decisive-acquitted by the movements of insurrection in the logging to the independence of numerous African and Asian Countries, they authorize to assert that in States, and especially in those in which deeper they are the distributions inside and shakier the claim of the government, the guerrilla antinazionale will certainly accompany, and in some case it will precede as component of a subversive trial, the to ignite of a general or local conflagration.

If this forecast-as we hold-the organization of the controguerriglia is spot-on it is primary demand in the picture of the national defence and in how much such it has to attentively be considered and valued in the answerable government assemblies. To neglect any foresight in the respects of a possible, not to say served, guerrilla, equivale-having to act you to on its way things-to grant that initial advantage that it wishes to the same guerrilla, to intervene under the harassing thought of the urgency, that is it always wins it will advise, to jeopardize vital preliminary activities of the army of country and, perhaps, to burden of heavy hypothecations the first operations whose result can be decisive for a Country of not remarkable military potential.

#### 5. Environmental elements and of situation that you/they favor the success of the controguerriglia

The first one of these elements seems us to consist in the absence of political hesitations in the behavior of the controguerriglia. We intend to say that in the territories where deeds are revealed, preferably prodromi, of guerrilla the military Authority has to be able to act without delays and without interferences.

The avvertimento can seem obvious and it is certainly it for the area of the operation for which the potestà of the tall military command is out discussion.

But the guerrilla can ignite, rather it is more probable than ignites, in the area of the inside and it is here where factors of various kind as the insufficient knowledge of the phenomenon or an optimistic assessment of the threat, could induce the political Authority to temporize.

We won't insist on this matter whose importance is conclusive but that esula from the theme of the present study.

The case is naturally different for the guerrilla that operates in the picture of a subversive war. Here in fact the armed claim intervenes only when, because of the conditioning subito, the Country is prepared to back her/it in wide measure. Also not leaving anything of unattempted, to mine the convictions of the rebels and their promoters, is worthwhile to devote the maximum cares to the moral safeguard of the armed forces, all or to a large extent in hand to the goals of the repression.

#### 6. Organization of the command

The first fundamental criterion to be respected in this sector is identified only in the conferment to an organ of all the connected liabilities the behavior of the operations of controguerriglia. What this organ has to be the military Authority and that I/you/he/she am him/it as soon as possible, also in that party of the national territory-not included in the area of the principal operations-where the guerrilla makes to not only weigh on the military objectives but also, and preferably actually to when you/he/she won't have acquired conscience of its strength, on fittingses and installazioni of vital importance for the lifetime of the Country the form-of armed claim-with which such threat will be embodied, the necessity of rapid and massive reactions, the unitarietà that has to preside to the search of the information, to the individualization of the themes of the propaganda avversaria, to the behavior of the psychological battle, they don't bear overlaps, interferences, dualisms and tantomeno collegiality.

The joinder of the powers in an only hand must not be intended, nevertheless, as centralization. This, for the dead times that it absorbs info-decision-feasance it draws her/it, ache would be reconciled with the necessity to quickly intervene.

It achieves a second criterion of it, consistent-as we will see soon-in to decree the executive function, or rather the organization and the behavior of the defensive claims and the local reactions.

#### 7. Organization of the psychological country

The importance of the propaganda, to which better is worthwhile the appellative of psychological claim in the picture both of the guerrilla and of the controguerriglia have repeatedly noticed.

Reporting himself/herself/itself to the organization of the second, it is necessary to make some distinzioni, that already keeps in mind of the considerations turns speaking of the physiognomy of the controguerriglia and the elements that you/they favor the success of it.

I orchestrate essential of the repressive claim, in whatever environmental situation is effected (traditional war or subversive war, national territory or foreign territory), they are the armed forces and, particularly, the army. The safeguard of their moral compactness competes to their Heads and founds him on factors of moral order (the patriotism, the military honor, the team spirit, the discipline, the ascendancy of the heads) and of material order (the efficiency of the weapons, the conditions of lifetime) that, also having a traditional trust, they have to mould him to the historical moment, above all as it regards their config and the way of spreading them.

Nevertheless, you/he/she cannot be ignored that the army and the drives destined to the controguerriglia are especially submitted avversaria to the propaganda, that-resorting to all the means in his/her tenure-aim on one side to mine the trust in the factors of moral order to which we mentioned poc'anzi, from the other to inject the motives proper of the ideology from which it promana.

It achieves of it that the safeguard of the military structure, if he/she wants to be realistic, it will

have to keep in mind, in the national territory, also of the contrasts that divide the Country and that you/they have determined, exasperating himself/herself/itself or for natural trial or for war fact, the to rise up some guerrilla.

But more and before to the army, the hostile propaganda turns him, we have seen him/it, to the population and it is therefore to this that will have to address him the claim psychological defensive strengthening the trust in the national institutions, showing the fallacità of the opposite theses and graduating its themes in relationship to the characteristics of the social stratification, to the local traditions, to the orientations that manifests by hand by hand the Country.

In short, a plan of psychological claim is convenient that has set, since time of peace or to deteriorate himself/herself/themselves some international situation inside e/o, to work of the political Authority with the collaboration of that military. Such plan would owe, essentially, to define the liabilities, to establish purposes to reach and themes to be developed on the base of various political hypotheses to point out the means to use.

## 8. The claims typical of the controguerriglia

The committal is the claim of fire with which the flat places react to the attempts of sabotage of the guerrilleros.

The patrol is developed by the mobile nucleuses of the system of protection to prevent the surprise.

The retaliation is an answer to the claims typical of the guerrilla when a more direct and immediate claim is not possible. It arouses adverse reactions in the population and you/he/she must be effected therefore only when this is decidedly favorable to the guerrilla.

The raking (tells Vietnam with very effective expression “operation of it looks for and you zap”) curtains to eliminate consistent drives guerrigliere. It consists in offensive claims, similar to those of the traditional operations, and of claims defensives to determined time, creanti in their whole a circle rinserrantesi progressively.

## APPENDIX D

### Guerrilla is CONTROGUERRIGLIA Ten. With the. Tullio Bottiglioni

#### 1. Premise

It is predictable that, if our Country will be one day involved in a conflict, it will be also theater of claims of guerrilla and controguerriglia. If we will clearly find us of forehead to an adversary of strength soverchiante, the only thing that the Armed forces can probably do for avoiding the apprehension, to survive and to operate, will subsequently be to turn himself/herself/themselves into clandestine strengths, to apply to a form of struggle “not conventional”, that is to the guerrilla, to keep on fighting somehow the enemy and to attend best times, as for instance, an allied claim that the situation reestablishes. If, instead, the enemy will be of strength peer or inferior to ours, the Armed forces, and especially the Policemen, the Watches of Department of Internal Revenue and Police, will have called to effect operations of controguerriglia to face the claims of sabotage and trouble, fed by the outside, in the eventuality in which potentially the political situation and the existence in the Country of subversive strengths leave entrance to foresee.

#### 2. The phases of the guerrilla

Generally the guerrilla is preceded or it begins with civil disorders or riots of plaza, with strikes to

chain, and, accordingly, deceleration of the outturn and depression of job and economic that, creating uneasiness and insecurity, they embitter the minds; you/he/she can continue then with sabotages to the manufacturing proprietorship, to the machineries, to the commodities, to the first subjects, to the fittingses of public utility as the waterworks, voters, of the telecommunications and of the carriages, to the purpose to put in difficulty the constituted authorities, to exasperate the malcontent of the population and to psychologically prepare the ground to the following claims.

A second phase can assume terrorist aspects, to force the government to operate on the defensive, behind the protection of the armed departments, that is from a humiliating position morally, with the goal to overturn the order constituted by the State. Not terrorism provokes rarely reactions that can be useful a great deal to the sub-judice of the guerrilleros more of the property loss brought with the terrorist claims themselves: this occurs when there is injured parties or martyrs of the movement, because every revolution purchases moral strength from its martyrs. To the popularization of the Christianity it contributed, undoubtedly, also the martyrdom of the injured parties of the persecutions. If the claim guerrigliera succeeds in putting the government against which it is turned under the conditions not to be able to maintain the order, not to be able to guarantee to the citizens the operation of their civil liberties and the safety, the discredit of the government himself it will increase more always, his/her opponents will become more and more numerous, and this, united to the constant propagandist claim, will push many citizens of every class and condition from the party of the guerrilleros.

### 3. Conclusions

The guerrilla has lost his congenial characteristic of more spontaneous reaction, and, sometimes, desperate, to a social injustice, to a sopruso, to an assault, to a tyranny; 1) you/he/she is become, for States small and great, a mean of the politics, it "longa manus" of powers that, without too much undertaking himself/herself/themselves, wants to persecute one particular objective of theirs, a way of testing the strength and the decision of the adversary, to know if the claim can be interrupted beginning diplomatic plea bargaining. 2) it doesn't derive from spontaneity anymore but computational, it is preorganizzata in his/her ideological and psychological aspects, in his/her material behavior. The guerrillas have a proper sorting order, own means, own bailments secret, prepared since the time of peace, own formalities of claim and own tactics; a military doctrine of the guerrilla was born.

3) tightly tied up to a coincident or compatible political or social ideology with that of the people to which the guerrilleros necessarily have to lean on himself/herself/themselves to have good probabilities of success, the guerrilla, if well arranged, conducted and advertised, you/he/she can achieve important results and to constitute a deterrent factor as many as believable as that atomic.

4) gives the frequency with which, in our time, it occurs, there is to believe that, besides the special prepared drives specifically and you train for this type of struggle, also regular strengths have to be able to sustain her/it.

5) on-line General the organization, the formalities of claim, the logistic demands, the psychological aspects, are common to the guerrilla and to the controguerriglia.

6) in a war future two components of relief will have to be kept in consideration: that atomic bomb and that subversive. This last unlike her before it is essentially based on the technology, it has as principal subject the man with all of his/her problems of moral and material order, his/her ideologies, his/her passions, his/her excesses of fanaticism, of hate, of cupidity; it owes, therefore to be sprite of an accurate material and moral preparation.

7) some military researchers believe that the war of the future will happen among two opposite ideologies and that, therefore, you/he/she must not be fight from armies of conscription, but from voluntary voted to their ideology. Then, since in a free Country and democrat every estimation is respected and a blind faith in an ideology cannot be imposed, the moral strength of the soldiers has to spring from the deep conviction in the necessity to protect and to defend the institutions and the democratic liberties against every subversive, outdoor and inside duress.

8) the development of adverse ideological situations to the constituted order and the regime vigente, also out of a declared conflict, it is easily predictable; the depressions plaintiffs in various parties of the

world often testify the immanence of this threat. It needs, therefore, that to the preparations to face and to sustain the war for gangs all the possible attentions and all the possible efforts is devoted, that is realized and maintained a favorable psychological situation that allows the Fozes armed with to develop, according to the cases, operations of guerrilla or controguerriglia, avoiding so the danger to run into the foregone failures of the dilettantism and the improvisations of the last time.

## APPENDIX IS

### The War PSICOLOGICAdi Piero Barons

#### 1. Definition of the psychological war

to. Doctrinaire Concetto

The whole the operations, of the claims, of the initiatives tendenti to achieve the objective to assume and to maintain the control of great layers of masses and to pilot the estimations, the judgments and the consequent demonstrations of it, acting on the instinctive receptiveness, on the emotionalism and on the formative trial of the assessments, *psychological war is defined.*

b. Nature of the concept

From here the necessity to resort to systematic methodologies type different, in degree to act on the whole connective fabric that he intends to attack moving from a series of fundamental premises,:

- study of the character and the mentality;
- search on the formative trial of the estimations;
- individualization of the language or the logic trial to which one determined population is more sensitive and receptive, with the purpose to exclude or to abridge in departure possible suspects.

In the substance it deals with convincing, to get consensus, to acquire support; or to achieve the acquiescence of the sprite of the operation, without using half violent, therefore through a persuasive procedure graduated in the time, constant in the intensity.

You is in presence of the *psychological claim* and the *hidden enticement*, the two hinges of the psychological war.

c. Philosophy of the concept

The espionage is the science of the war. The psychological war is the philosophical essence of the *lump strategy*. This last is the employment of all the resources and all the strengths of a nation to the purpose to achieve a situation of peace (or of war not waged war) in conformity with to the demands of the national politics.

You immediately has to specify that for war he doesn't intend only the armed conflict but the whole ample fan of the war, in which the military comparison is only the last aspect.

And it is really in this premise and in what it follows that reside the principle and assumes him some psychological war.

Among the state of tension and the war waged war there is a complex series of more flexible phases:

- the insinuations, the accusations, the mean provocations countries of printout;
- the political pressure;
- the lump spy offensive;
- the retorsions and the economic sanctions;
- strength's demonstrations;
- the subversive claim;
- the guerrilla.

Traditional movements, enough you serve and predictable.

The exploitation of the unconscious fear and the spiritual and intellectual weakness, the habit to one determined condition and the latent threat of a sudden and irreversible shift, pass through the solicitation of the whole sensorial range, pressing, as, on the uncertainty, on the apprehension, on the fear, on the intolerance, on the irritation, on the anguish, actually to the terror and the panic.

## 2. Purposes and objectives

The psychological war is wisely suitable to such dogma and the postulation second which the enticement (direct, induced, of reflex and for imitation), pagante is very more in comparison to the claim of strength in indefeasible, that is not instead to exclude him if employed within a lump strategy as element of indirect pontage to the penetratività of the *proposals*.

In the center of config of the thematic one it is enough to say that the psychological war is not set limits neither moral, neither by law international. The misinformation and the manipulation of the news are entirely *congeable* canons. Such technique runs over all the possible objectives and segnatamente the followings: political, economic, informative, social, cultural, formative, subversive. You adds that where necessary he resorts to the employment of the financial aspect (corruption, blackmail, blackmail).

The psychological war is certainly a science and a doctrine. You characterizes for the great multiplicity of the choices and the solutions. It conforms him to every useful situation, exploiting her/it folding up her/it to his/her own goal. It is a refined tool that employs all the applicable advanced technologies, but above all it distinguishes him for the high-level of rationalization of the thought and the analysis. To the psychological war some are owed between the brightest intuitions and applications of the availment of the intellectual trial in the sector of the info and it are from such experimentation-application that the certainty of the validity of the procedure is derived, flowed in the years '50 in a systematic doctrine and in a procedure applied on vast staircase.

The psychological war allows to neutralize the adversary without the petition to the strength:

- it allows to weaken the centers vital adversaries emptying of reactive promptness his/her decisional nucleuses;
- it realizes the infiltration, the penetration, the position of heads of bridge e/o of specialized single-hit operators highly, in the vital ganglions of the organization to be defeated;
- it allows the enlistment, the control, the enslavement of elements adversaries through a triplex line of claim: the acquisition through belief e/o conditioning; or through remuneration or through pressure;
- it allows the control of you address him political-informative-formative and the pilotage of the great movements of the estimations.

The all in midrange-long times, with an enormous flexibility and a fan of tactical solutions, constantly in movement.

## 3. Deception and simulation

to. Concetto

The claim of psychological war essentially finds him on the deception and on the simulation. It is necessary to change the typesetting of the apparent reality, interposing a consistent config to the purposes among what appears and what is wanted to make to appear, always building different situations according to what is wanted to get.

b. Nature

To change you determine situations, or to store her, is essential to check the estimations and being in condition to preventively intervene, to the source, with the purpose to carry her, to solicit her, to suggest her, to manipulate her, to exorcize her, to exalt her, to suffocate her, to denaturalize her, to replace her to mould her.

Since the individual-man is not evolved to the state of self-discipline and self-government yet, the *principle of the proxy* is in force. Power is attributed to lay-outs in comparison to which the individual-man is subject however. This condition, depriving him/it some *indefeasible liberty*, it resolves him in a restriction and in a psychological constraint. He is proper succubo in how much the space of manoeuvre is him imposed.

The relationship city-been in effects should be a contract, but so it is not. You resolves in a blank proxy, entirely atypical, because it doesn't allow a control and not even a countermand in case of mistrust. The everything remains out of the direct intervention of the citizen that such it is only *of principle*, but not of fact. The claim of power is practiced above and out of the affairs of the citizen.

The measure of the *status* varies to second that the citizen is found in a condition of subject of a democracy or a totalitarian system or *unipartito*. The variation, is not so sensitive however as, it appears.

The psychological war hooks its claim really from this pixel of departure. The malcontent, the dissatisfaction, if not really grudge, represents the impetus of the operation. The created image leans on what you/he/she could be gotten and you/he/she cannot be gotten one determined situation remaining, that dominant.

The double aspect of the initiatives materializes him as it follows: from a side the inclined tendente to consolidate the existing situation; from the other the claim stretched out to scalzarla to substantially replace her/it with another identical, but formally different, endowed with an image built to measure than it is pleasant, embellished with particular accattivanti.

In a picture so defined, the subjects submitted to the claim of psychological war are found in a completely passive position and they react only with his/her own individual critical resources.

Just to contain before and to quash then the effects of such resistance, the claim of psychological war, from whatever party originates, it resorts to the deception and the simulation.

You has the tendency to represent a reality scenografica and operational fit to disguise that authentic; he resorts to the demagogy, to the sensations, to the graduated pretenses, realizing an abearance able to suddenly strike the receptiveness of the subjects creating in the instinctive trial a kind of short circuit. The critical procedure *skips* so that possible energetic *calls* to the rationality find difficulty to come true himself/herself/themselves in front of the doses of doubt and distrust absorbed in precedence.

Emotionalism also prevails on the reasoning in strength of the propensity of the individual to choose the most comfortable solution, less binding, simpler, less coinvolgente, from the viewpoint of the hazard.

Simulation and deception realize him in every situation in which he intends to introduce an artificial reality and however are wanted to engrave on qualsivoglia orientation.

#### 4. Some examples of psychological war of the past

to. The terrorism as war procedure

The government of London with that operation applied the procedures of the terrorism, using her as arms psychological.

It showed his firm and definite wish to strike the hostile vertexes highlighting already sued vulnerability her/it of it, but above all it put in prominence some important aspects to the effects of the consequences and the repercussions, less resounding and fluorescent and really for this most penetrating:

1) it highly had a flexible mentality, even kaleidoscopic in to contrive solutions to strike the enemy, also clearly finding himself/herself/itself in a strategic situation and inferior tactic, on the edge of the defeat (subsequently the commandoses tried to eliminate Rommel, in Northern Africa, while the Americans, on the example English, succeeded in killing the admiral Yamamoto, brain of high-powered intelligence and authentic inspirer and craftsman of the strategy nipponica);

2) it showed to know how to resort to all the means, anybody excluded, also to regain the initiative and however not to crack, maintaining the moral record in the judgments and in the assessments of the neutral ones, arousing the admiration, the respect and the consequent backing of it;

3) it applied subversive criterions, preconfigurando the revolutionary war, thickly using the broadcast propaganda, arranging tangled nets of informants and saboteurs, plotting an imposing

cobweb of contacts, linkings, infiltrations, penetrations, sting of backing logistic and tactical for small trained qualified commandos highly and trained, substantially suicides;

4) it imposed a psychological reflection to the enemy on the nature of the struggle and on the unpredictability of the movements, shaking the safety of it and cracking the certainties of it;

5) it delineated the concepts of a different type of war, founded upon the enticement through the words and on the operations to tall intrinsic value and to low cost, allowing to realize to the most careful the profitableness and the superior effectiveness of claims against objective selected and vital;

6) it showed the superiority of the quality towards the quantity, pointing out the route to follow for assuming the control from the dialectical front, important at least how much that technological and military, this last not immune to the persuasive claim and condizionante.

b. Goebbels: the genius of the propaganda

It possessed «the ambiguous omnipotence of the German intellectual» «... despite the horror that does us, we have to recognize that (...) it was the true man in our century. A weapon missed only him: the television. With that in hand you/he/she would have been immortal» (Guido Gerosa).

«... he revealed (...) a superb professional in the art of the propagandist transmission», «... it chained the public with the bright style and nevertheless always characterized by a simplicity that it made him/it comprehensible to all» (H.W. Koch, of the university in York).

Propaganda of party, radio, cinema, theater and music were employed for indottrinare, to check, to pilot, to mould, to forge, to address the Germanic population and to influence, to fascinate, to influence the outdoor listeners, with a methodology actually to then unknown. Above all the radio became a mighty tool. In 1943, 130 waves short stations daily spread 279 newsletters in 53 languages.

In 1944, when the allies had already invaded Europe and the course of the war he/she didn't leave space to interpretations around his/her trailing result, the minister of the propaganda it created his/her masterpiece: a system of stations radio anti-Nazi using «convincing antinazisti, if not convinced», you destine to Europe it unlocks. «National Bruxelles», «You voice of Belgium», «Radio the partisan Ukraine». etc. Also employing non-resident alien, city of countries unlocked by the allied troops, Goebbels fed the contradictions between the political strengths and the soldiers in war against Germany, attaching the Nazism, but mixing to such virulent claim the figure of the new occupants, American, Canadian, English, Australians, the aspirations it disappointed of how much you/they had fought beside English and Americans and hourly you/they were remised (Polish for instance, certain party of French), the new servitudes that he went outlining, the cost of the war to favor the victory of the new masters, etc.

A very beautiful voice, a sophisticated and acute intelligence, a wish supported by a boundless ambition, an indefinable charm in a graceless body. This the man. He/she knew how to also apply to every mean to reach the purpose. Its preferred slogan was: «You/they can insult us, to slander us, to fight us, but they have to speak of us». Hitler had written that people doesn't want to read: «The great masses of a nation will always surrender him and only to the strength of the spoken word», and still: «It needs to unhide that aspect of the truth that speaks to the alone public in really favor».

The climate of the years '20 and the beginnings of the years '30s asked for a disruptive style, new, nonconformist, resounding, roboante, inversely proportional to the state of prostration of the population. The war imposed a constant presence, massive of the propaganda and Goebbels it adjusted the language to the new demands, showing the effectiveness of its system and its method, overcoming, in the offensive of the words, the military yardsticks of the conflict, realizing and preconfigurando the themes of the cold war, settling the ideological war to that psychological in the whole range of its solutions and its shades, conforming her/it to the psychological claim, applying the criterions of the most advanced dialectics, building a logic, a rationality new, sustaining and asserting the ideas and the motivations well over the dominant reality of the relationship of contingent strengths.

His was a tied up psychological war to the situation for the used reasonings but a true indefeasible doctrine as philosophy and call.

It was the first lump application of the progressive conditioning with the control and the indiscriminate petition to all the in hand means (printout), with the introduction of new (cinema, art, music) and the improvement of those already used (apparent, books of text), with the exploitation and the adaptation in great style of other people's intuitions (from the fascismo:manifestazioni

gymnastic-sporting, historical exaltation of the past, cult of the antiquity).

What is followed since then it technically derives and conceptually from that period and from that doctrine. The supreme mean was the radiofonia, employed to the limit of the perfection. The radio as penetration, imposition of theories, concepts, criterions of assessment, procedures of judgment, oppositions of matters, demolition of myths and exaltation of others; the used radio as vehicle of the new style of communication and as pixel of reference, indifferibile, indisputable. Half risen to source detector of truth.

«The radio has told him/it.» The overall attainment, the complete subjection.

## 5. The psychological war as fundamental element in the lump strategy

From how much it precedes it results clear the necessity of the petition to persuasive means constrictive e/o, such to totally allow the amplification of the control areas and supremacy and the attainment of immune operational scacchieri the trap of the criticism and the active reflection. In the international picture the psychological war assumes a prominent role in consideration of the impossibility, in determined sectors of claim to resort to forms of direct and decisive intervention. The use of the words and the images in a logic predestined for *forcing* without ricorso to the physical strength material e/o is the only possible alternative in an extremely critical situation, where the comparison, in power, of system of weapon conventional and nuclear it doesn't allow war operations if not marginal, but however rientranti in the overhead sketch and not certainly extraneous to the trailing objective that was, it is, he/she remains and he/she will remain, the adversary's enslavement.

If the military apparatus is the direct expression of the reached scientific and technological level, it-contrarily to how much he generally asserts-it doesn't express a dissuasive deterrent, but it represents the pixel of departure of the psychological attack to achieve the conquest of the head of bridge constituted by the feeling of uncertainty, uneasiness and instinctive fear generated in the subjects, forced so on the unconscious defensive, above all situated in the *dimension of the sprite*, a passive position.

The pressure so indirectly practiced, and already by itself elementary and rough claim of psychological war, would not be enough. The persuasive claim intervenes, then both in positive sense, both in that adverse, and prevails shortly using the image of the threat camouflaging so the proper one, camouflaging her/it according to the moment and of the scenery, flowing in its stand-alone dimension: a mean of avant-garde highly sophisticated to suggest, to advise, to impose abearances and ways of. Its pretense becomes prominent really in strength of its capability penetrativa to all the levels, of the variety of the allowed solutions, of the not individualization and location and of the impossibility to grab its logic. Its manifold activity in the most disparate compartments prevents the subject the approach of the different attacks in the common denominator of the unitary offensive.

Developing himself/herself/itself, the political comparison, within channels enough served and in the gross traditional, the claim *of bump is* submitted to the psychological war (and to the espionage) that it becomes, with that hidden, the vector of the doctrine through the spokesman official, and the vehicle of the enticement through other means.

If once was said, as already remembered, that the nation with the most greater number of spies won the war, hourly you/he/she can be said that who has the most prepared *staffs* in the psychological analysis of mass and the journalists, employed to the specific service, more acute and constantly up-to-date, it will win the new type of war in how much it is had to fight the conflict of the words, of their modulation, of their cut, the war of the images, of the assemblage and of his thin, innumerable resources.

## 6. The principles, the concepts, the criterions, the tools

to. The in hand means and the applicable methodologies

The television, the radio, the printout, the cinema, the advertising (in his/her various forms), the songs, the theater, the painting, the manifestos, the poster, the books (as a whole, inclusive those of text) they are the half in hand technicians, the vectors, the channels, the vehicles through which to radio and to spread the messagings.

The misinformation and the manipulation of the news represent the two hinges of the technical procedure.

The misinformation consists in the incomplete supply, inaccurate, spoiled, not for malice, of the same news.

The manipulation consists in the distorsion, in the pollution, in the tendentiousness, in the poisoning of the news that results artificial in such way, corrupted, fraudulently distorted, even if it formally appears correct and believable.

b. Propaganda and hidden enticement

In the picture the tool strike is inserted, mighty weapon of pressure, but also tool disgregante when used not as correct answer negotiate her, but as resource of psychological war. In 1984, the eight months of strike of the miners in Great Britain and the revelation of financings sip us to the syndical vertex, you/they have constituted a particular aspect, but in every component case of a sketch not certainly random.

Other aspect of the new propaganda is the mobilization of mass with forgeries purposes: hunger in the world, pacifism, disarmament, ecology.

If the propaganda with the resonance and the immediateness booms, it stuns, it imposes its presence, but as many quickly it evaporates, contrarily the hidden enticement-and here he enters the thematic procedural specification-work tenaciously, silently with great effectiveness, often using as I screen or stings of lance, really the propaganda, even using the so-called provocative syndics, inventing and feeding the depressions, contriving problem list to arouse debates, financing journals, television and broadcast stations, films and telefilms, comic strips, etc. Its strength resides in the sistematicità of the method, to high flexibility and adaptability.

The psychological war in its sistematicità exploits the contradictions, it wedges him with its position destabilizzante, it provokes situations, keeping in mind of well you individualize and essential realities:

- 1) the news pardon quickly his/her own power calamitante;
- 2) the subjects extend to the habit and they are accommodated for atavistic custom;
- 3) the subjects distrust and they are always waited for the worse, being also prepared to the compromise.

## 7. The countermeasures

If the psychological war is able usufruire of ample spaces, it is as many true that can be opposed her/it, but to condition to know the trap, the mental construction and not to undervalue her/it.

They result evident the in demand characteristics to a man of the psychological against-war: solid and ample preparation of base, deep and up-to-date specialization, realized, propensity to the investigation, capability of synthesis and logic and analogical Association, rapidity of read, perception and sense of the news, photographic memory, knowledge of overseas countries. If the medium of the calculator is sootointeso, this doesn't mean disqualification of the man, in how much the location of the trap and the threat can be made only by the professional and by its intelligence.

## 8. Lexicon of the psychological war

to. Training

Operation methodic and long-term that doesn't substantially have limits of time as the comparisons, the verifications, controls are implicit in the same activity and in the quality of the developed job, the

only effective yardstick.

The essential requirement is the capability to trace the abearance knowing how to individualize the origins and the motivations of it. The fundamental dowries are the intuition and the acumen united to the perspicacity. The training takes the movements from the study of the reactions of forehead to a series of solicitations: the death, the poverty, the danger, the threat and the adverse unforeseen event; the success, the wealth, the passion, the ambition, the positive unforeseen event.

They faces, subsequently, the provoked reactions, in the subjects and in the GROUPs, from the facts of blood, from the slaughters, from the calamities, from the calamities, attentively appraising the relative abearances, determining the times of reaction and their course, from the beginning to the maximum expansion of the phenomenon, to the phase of expansion to that of contraction and fall. You passes then tipologica to the tracking and cataloguing for geographical sectors, for sex, age, social layer, cultural, financial, ideological, religious, individualizing so the midrange reactive trends of the various standardses attributing to them a value related to the density of the presence and to the intensity of the reaction. Subsequently he proceeds to the cross verification and to that random; the first one consists of launching an identical impulse for intensity and nature in two or more specific sectors, videotaping then the reactions through random checks, flying interviews, investigations, reserved investigations; the second realizes him with a control to the dark, that is without predetermining the sector and without knowing him/it. The *answers* vagliate, confrontate, opportunely traces and elaborate, they will allow to reduce the margin of hazard and bug in the future claim to conduct.

You passes to the learning of the operational techniques, taking care of particularly the preparation in to know how to instantly gather the good buys and the opportunities to strike the subjects with the choice of the news and the use of the words in the *text* and in the *securities*, as also of the images, and besides minding sucitare the opportune feelings (anger, impotence, scorn, steadiness, disappointment, pity, etc.) in the readout and in the story.

Propedeutiches to a constant refinement are live the read and the observation of the reality, with the purpose to gather live, with the second, the reactions aroused by the expressions of the faces, from the attitude, from the comments, from the type of silence and from the graduation of the apparent or real indifference.

With the read, side is held the accrual of the attention instead, it becomes larger the knowledge, that of the language particularly, thinness of logic and he are acquired it improves the capability of analysis of synthesis and of intuition.

Exhausted the theoretical-experimental phase, the training is completed with cognitive experiences on the ground of claim to be able to find the capability of the student in to gather the shades, parametrandole with the operational analyses. It is a criminal evidence that doesn't leave margins to the bug. Only the student that knows how to exactly frame the situation will become an expert.

#### b. Bank of the data

Information System compiuterizzato. Harvest, elaboration, logic and functional accomodation of the acquired news and immission of the data in an accessible calculator exclusively to personal classified. Heart of the whole operational complex; reference of every manoeuvre; analytical-descriptive-comparative tool of all the initiatives.

The organizations that have perceived the importance of the problem proceeding to the construction of a cabinet with at the right moment key than interpretation and vertical, horizontal and cross linkings, they currently have an irreplaceable tool authentic strategic memory from which it is possible to draw enormous references and eleborazioni.

#### c. Control

The control of the sources and the diffusion of the news; objective tactical attainable through a double claim: progressive infiltration in the agencies of printout and in the journalistic headings. The news published by the daily paper and spread from the radio or from the television they originate from the net of the agencies of printout (Reuter, France Presse, Associated Press, United Press, Handle). The dispatches of agency reach the editings through teleprinters (or in video with the most advanced systems to storage and call of memory) in the following languages: English, French, Spanish, Italian. They has, generally, the following genesis: signaling from the informant, harvest from the zonal or sectorial

editing, forwarding to the head office, control and verification, editing of the text, control, gateway to the traffic, networked diffusion. In particular cases the agencies use the correspondent, the special envoy, the specialized editor and they spread «special services». In other cases it is the heading same that employs the envoy and in this case it excludes the dispatches of agency or as element of pure comparison uses them.

The psychological war infiltrates its specialiaistis to the various levels, with the hedging of the journalist, it enlists journalists in every possible heading, it conditions professionals inside the various headings, it exploits the unconscious allies to the purpose to insert in the various journals its impulses.